The 1987 Maryland train collision occurred at 1:30 am on January 4, 1987, on the main line of Amtrak's Northeast Corridor. The crash site took place in the Chase community east of Baltimore County, Maryland, United States, at Gunpowder Interlocking, about 18 miles (29 km) northeast of Baltimore. Amtrak train 94, Colonial , (now part of Northeast Region ) moving north from Washington, DC, to Boston, crashing into a set of lightweight Conrail locomotives (without carriage of goods), and which has polluted (entered) the main line. Train speed 94 at the time of the collision is estimated at about 108 miles per hour (174 km/h). Fourteen passengers on the Amtrak train were killed, as well as Amtrak engineers and car room attendants.
The crew of the Conrail locomotive failed to stop at the signal before Gunpowder Interlocking, and determined that the accident would be avoided if they did. In addition, they tested positive for marijuana. The engineer served four years in a Maryland prison for his role in the accident. As a result, drug and alcohol procedures for crew members were overhauled by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), which is charged with rail safety. In 1991, largely driven by the Chase Maryland crash, the United States Congress even took wider action and authorized mandatory random drug testing for all employees in "sensitive safety" jobs in all industries regulated by the US Department of Transport (DOT). ) including trucks, bus operators and rail systems. In addition, all trains operating in high-speed Northeast Corridor are now equipped with automatic taxi signaling with automatic train stops feature. Some security issues are identified with Amfleet cars as well.
At that time, the accident was the deadliest in Amtrak history. It was then surpassed in 1993, during an accident at Big Bayou Canot in Alabama that killed 47 and injured 103 others.
Video 1987 Maryland train collision
Crash pre-collision movement
Amtrak Train 94
Amtrak Train 94 ( Colonial ) leaves Washington Union Station at 12:30 pm (Eastern time) for Boston South Station. The train has 12 cars and is filled by travelers returning from the holiday season to their homes and schools for the second half of the year. Two AEM-7 locomotives, numbered 900 and 903, led the train; # 903 is the main locomotive. The engineer is 35-year-old Jerome Evans.
After leaving Baltimore, Maryland Amtrak station, the next stop is Wilmington, Delaware. In northern Baltimore, while still in Baltimore County, the four-lane Northeast Corridor narrowed into two lanes at Gunpowder Interlocking just before crossing the Gunpowder River. The train drove north toward that location.
Movement of light contrast engine
Ricky Lynn Gates, a Penn Central and Conrail engineer since 1973, operates the GE B36-7 lightweight locomotive Conrail triad (without freight cars) from Conrail's Bayview Yard just east of Baltimore leading to Enola Yard near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Gates then decided to break some of the signal and operating rules, including failure to test the taxi signal as required before departure from Bayview. He later discovers that someone has disabled the taxi signal reporter in front of unit # 5044 with tape, silencing it almost completely. Also, one of the light bulbs in the PRR style cab display is removed. Researchers believe these conditions may exist prior to departure from Bayview and that they will be revealed by a properly performed departure test.
Gates and his men, Edward "Butch" Cromwell, also smoked marijuana. Cromwell was responsible for calling a signal if Gates missed it, but failed to do so.
Maps 1987 Maryland train collision
Collision
When Amtrak Train 94 approached the Gunpowder Interlocking near the Chase community on the mainstream through which electricity flowed, three Conrail cargo locomotives moved north on one of the adjacent shipping lanes. Before the adjacent tracks reached the bridge in the river, they merged into two through the path that crossed the bridge.
While interconnected tracks and factories at this location are marked to warn locomotive engineers when the interlocking switch is set for via train train movement, the switch is not designed to stop locomotives or trains running through them when they are aligned to pass through the train track movement.
In the case of an accident, the interlocking plant is well managed through track movement, allowing the Amtrak train to pass through the goods locomotive (which should stop at the side track) on the track through to and through the bridge. The cargo locomotive engineers ignore the stop signal in their locomotive cabin (which is muted), and on the track, visible to them from their locomotive cabin.
The speed/event recording device shows that the Conrail locomotive is moving about 60 miles per hour (97 km/h) when their brakes are applied for emergency stop, once they pass the track signal. This, Gates later claimed, when he realized that he did not have a roadside signal to proceed north at interlocking. He, however, moves too fast to stop before passing a signal indicating he should stop clearing the main line approaching # 94. Suppose Gates reacts well to the approach signal that instructs him to reduce speed, or stop the signal itself in a timely manner, or order a brakeman calling the signal state as it was supposed to do, the possibility that Conrail's machine could have stopped switching.
The Conrail locomotive stops on the track right in front of # 94, which approaches speeds between 120 and 125 mph (193 and 201 km/h). Although the maximum allowed speed for the AEM-7 Amtrak locomotive carrying the car in this corridor is 125 mph, # 94 carries a Heritage-style passenger car, which the maximum allowable speed is limited to 105 mph (169 km/h). The conductor for # 94 testified that he told the engineer the injured carriage was badly wounded from a Heritage car on a train; in any case, its presence means the Amtrak train is speeding. With little time to react, the engineer Amtrak Evans apparently saw a diesel engine at the front line and installed the brakes for emergency stop. The NTSB specifies that even if # 94 has traveled at a speed of 105 mph (169 km/h), the official Amtrak speed limit, collision can not be avoided at this point.
On impact, the rearmost Conrail diesel, GE B36-7 # 5045 exploded and caught fire. It was completely destroyed to the frame and never rebuilt. The middle unit, # 5052, suffered significant damage on the front but was then rebuilt and returned to service. Lead unit # 5044 has little damage.
One of Amtrak's AEM-7s, # 900, is buried under the wreckage, while the main locomotive, # 903, ends between several trees on the western right side of the road. Some Amfleet Budd Company cars piled up, with some crumbling under the pile.
Cromwell, who was in the main engine with Gates, suffered a broken leg due to a collision. Gates is not hurt. Amtrak engineers, Space officers in front of the car and 14 passengers were killed.
The front car on the Amtrak # 94 train suffered the biggest damage and almost completely destroyed. But they are almost empty waiting for the extra leisure passengers who will ride the train at the station further north. According to NTSB, if these cars are full at the time, the death toll must be at least 100. The number of passengers in the car is relatively small, so the death toll is much less. Most of the dead were in Amtrak # 21236.
Post-collision response and cleanup
With a total passenger number of about 600 people, there is a lot of confusion after the collision. Witnesses and neighbors ran to the smoking trains and helped dispose of injured and dazed passengers even before the first emergency vehicle could arrive at the scene.
While many injured passengers are assisted by nearby residents, some unhurt passengers get lost, making Amtrak difficult to know the full story.
Emergency personnel work for hours in cold, cold air to unleash trapped passengers, hampered by the stainless steel anti-corrosion resistance of Amfleet against ordinary hydraulic rescue devices. Helicopters and ambulances transport wounded people to hospitals and trauma centers. It was more than 10 hours after the collision before the last trapped people were freed from the wreckage.
It was a few days before the broken equipment was removed and the tracks and electrical propulsion system restored to service.
Investigations, bills and confidence
At first, Gates and Cromwell denied smoking marijuana. However, they were then tested positive for the substance. Investigation of the National Transportation Safety Board revealed that if Gates slowed down the required signal, he would stop on time. It also determined that the use of Gates and Cromwell's marijuana was the "probable cause" of the accident. Gates and Cromwell were immediately suspended by Conrail waiting for an internal investigation, but resigned rather than face certain dismissals.
Gates was eventually charged with murder with a locomotive; under Maryland law, locomotives are motor vehicles. The prosecutor broke a deal with Cromwell in which he agreed to testify against Gates in exchange for immunity. Gates was sentenced to five years in state prison and one year probation, and was then sentenced to an additional three years on federal charges of lying to the NTSB. Gates's history of DWI's conviction (drunk driving) as well as his recognition that the crew has used marijuana when in charge of the lead to call for certification of locomotive engineers for their qualifications and history.
Toxicological tests on the body of Amtrak engineers returned negatively. In a 3-2 decision, the NTSB report stated that the speed of the train # 94 when the brakes were applied, between 120 and 125 mph (193 and 201 km/h), was an unauthorized excessive speed, due to the maximum for the Amtrak train carrying the Heritage car is 105 mph (169 km/h). Excessive speed is determined to be a contributing factor to the amount of damage on both trains at the point of impact. Two people who disagree with the report believe that it is unreasonable to assign responsibility to Amtrak engineers only on the premise of a Heritage car that lowers its speed limit.
Gates was released from prison in 1992 after serving four years (two years state conviction, then two years over a federal sentence), and then working as an abuse counselor at the treatment center. In a 1993 interview with Baltimore Sun , Gates said the accident would never have happened if it had not been for marijuana. He also revealed he has been smoking marijuana at work several times.
Changes for future prevention
As a result of the accident, all locomotives operating in the Northeast Corridor are now required to have automated taxi signals with automatic truck stop feature. Although common on passenger trains until then, cabin signals combined with train stops and speed control have never been installed on load locomotives due to the potential problems of handling high-speed trains. Conrail then developed a device called locomotive speed limiter (LSL), a computerized device designed to monitor and control the deceleration rate for a limited signal in conjunction with the cab signal. All locomotives operating in the Northeast Corridor should now be equipped with an operating LSL which also limits top speeds up to 50 mph (80 km/h). Prior to that, cargo locomotives were only required to have automated cab signals without the automatic train stop feature.
Also as a direct result of this collision, federal law is enacted which requires the FRA to develop a federal certification system for locomotive engineers. This regulation came into force in January 1990. Since then, trains are required by law to certify that their engineers are trained and qualified, and that they have no addiction to motor vehicles or alcohol defects during the five-year period prior to certification. Another effect is that age Rule G ( The use of liquor or narcotics by an employee who is the subject of a task, or theirs or used while on duty, is prohibited. - UCOR, 1962) changed be:
Employees reporting to duties under the influence of alcohol or other liquor, marijuana of any kind, amphetamines, narcotics, hallucinogenic drugs, any controlled substances (as defined by federal law), or derivatives or combinations of these , or who uses one of the previous on duty, will be dismissed. The ownership of any of the aforementioned while in charge of, or owning, using, or being under the influence of any of the foregoing persons while in the Company or facilities provided by the Company is prohibited. Source : Tennessee Valley Railway Operations Rule, effective March 15, 1995
A form of Rule G has been in many railway operating manuals for decades. However, federal codification of this rule is deemed necessary to ensure that any offender will be handled in a consistent and abusive manner. Also, anyone who passes the signal stops losing its FRA certification for a period of not less than 30 days for the first offense. This is per 49 CFR section 249.
In 1991 - largely caused by the Chase - Congress accidents authorized mandatory random drug testing for all employees in "safety-sensitive" jobs in industries governed by DOT.
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See also
- 1996 Maryland train collision, also involving Amtrak
- Hinton train collision, a similar accident in Canada the previous year in which goods were ignored signal and collided head-on with intercity passenger trains; The crew of the freight was also found to have adversely affected mental capacity (in their case due to insufficient rest and engineers may have a heart attack or stroke) and have disabled security features as well.
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References
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External links
- Picture AEM-7 Amtrak # 903 in Wilmington, Baltimore after an accident - http://www.railpictures.net/photo/78276/
- Figure 2 Amtrak AEM-7 on a flat car near the crash site - Lancaster Dispatcher - Lancaster Chapter SPKN (January 2010, Vol 41 # 1.) - http://nrhs1.org/images/Dispatcher_Jan_10.pdf
- Media related to the 1997 Maryland train collision on Wikimedia Commons
Source of the article : Wikipedia
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