Autonomous car liability (or liability of driverless cars, self-driving cars, or robotic cars) is a developing area of law and policy that will determine who is liable when an autonomous car causes harm to persons or property. As autonomous cars shift the responsibility of driving from humans to autonomous car technology, there is a need for existing liability laws to evolve in order to fairly identify the appropriate remedies for damage and injury. Increases in the use of autonomous car technologies (e.g. advanced driver-assistance systems) is not only causing incremental shifts in this responsibility of driving but also reducing the frequency of on the road accidents. As higher levels of autonomy are commercially introduced (level 3&4), the insurance industry stands to see greater proportions of commercial and product liability lines, while personal automobile insurance shrinks.
Video Autonomous car liability
Current liability frameworks
Existing tort liability for drivers and insurers and product liability for manufacturer provide the current basis for governing crashes.
Tort liability
There are three basic theories of tort liability: traditional negligence, no-fault liability and strict liability.
According to a National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey, over 90% of the crashes (representing an estimated 2 million crashes nationwide) involved the driver as the critical reason of the crash. Meanwhile, research from the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) shows that Advanced Driver-Assistance Systems, which are seen as stepping stones to get to Level 3 and 4 autonomy, have helped reduce accidents by employing forward collision warnings and automatic braking. Given these trends, increased use of autonomous vehicle technology could reduce the number of accidents and prevent crash-related deaths. Consequently, it is likely that cases of traditional negligence will fall and this will in turn reduce automobile-insurance costs.
With the onset of fully autonomous cars, it is possible that the need for specialized automobile insurance disappears and that health insurance and homeowner's liability insurance instead cover automobile crashes, much in the same way that it covers bicycle accidents. Moreover, as cases of traditional negligence decrease, no-fault insurance systems appear attractive given its benefits. It would provide compensation to victims relatively quickly and the compensation would not depend on the identification of a party at-fault. In such systems, individual drivers would be well protected and would encourage the adoption of autonomous cars for its safety and cost-related benefits.
Product liability
Product liability governs the liability of manufacturers in terms of negligence and strict liability.
In such cases, autonomous car manufacturers are compelled to reduce the danger of their products as much as they can within a reasonable cost structure. Yet, strict liability covers an expansive range of potential harms that manufacturers may find difficult to protect against. Manufacturers may then find themselves incentivized to pass on potential costs of liability to consumers through higher prices.
Furthermore, product liability cases distinguish among various types of defects.
Under manufacturing defects, a plaintiff needs to show that the autonomous car failed to work as specified by the manufacturer. In the case of autonomous cars, however, this presents a major hurdle because no court has applied manufacturing defects to software, which is not something tangible that is manufactured. If a crash stems from a software error, then the traditional product liability law on manufacturing defects may not suffice. A greater understanding of how software will be treated under this liability law, particularly when a software error causes physical parts to malfunction, needs to be explored.
Historically, courts have used two tests for defectiveness of design: consumer-expectations and cost-benefit.
Consumer-expectations: "A product is defective in design or formulation when it is more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner. Moreover, the question of what an ordinary consumer expects in terms of the risks posed by the product is generally one for the trier of fact." Given the broad nature of what consumers may expect out of autonomous cars, the consumer-expectation may result in substantial liability for manufacturers.
On the other hand, the cost-benefit test weighs the benefits against the costs of a product in determining whether a design is defective. With autonomous cars, the plaintiff could make the argument that a different design, whether in the physical features of the vehicle or in the software that controls the movements of the vehicle, could have made the vehicle safer. For plaintiffs, this creates a high burden of proof and also makes it difficult to find qualified experts.
Imposing liability
In asking "who do I sue," a plaintiff in a traditional car crash would assign blame to the driver or the car manufacturer, depending on the cause of the crash. In a crash involving an autonomous car, a plaintiff may have four options to pursue.
1) Operator of the vehicle: in Florida and Nevada, an operator is defined as a person who causes the autonomous technology to engage, regardless of whether the person is physically in the vehicle. California, on the other hand, specifies that an operator as "the person who is seated in the driver's seat, or, if there is no person in the driver's seat, causes the autonomous technology to engage."
The viability of a claim against the operator will determine on the level of autonomy. For instance, if the autonomous technology allows the passenger to cede full control to the vehicle, then the passenger will likely not be found to be at fault for a crash caused by the technology.
2) Car manufacturer: with this option, a plaintiff will need to determine whether the manufacturer had a part in installing autonomous technology into the vehicle. States such as Florida, however, are providing protection by limiting product liability for manufacturers.
3) Company that created the finished autonomous car: Volvo is an example of a manufacturer who has pledged to take full responsibility for accidents caused by its self-driving technology.
4) Company that created the autonomous car technology: Companies under this option could include those developing the software behind the autonomous car and those manufacturing the sensor systems that allow a vehicle to detect its surrounding.
Possible defenses
In defense of such liabilities, autonomous vehicle manufacturers could make the argument of comparative negligence, product misuse and state of the art. With comparative negligence, the driver or passenger interference is seen as a part of the cause of harm and injury. With product misuse, the driver or passenger may be at fault for disregarding directions or altering the vehicle in a way to affect the proper performance of the vehicle. With state of the art, manufacturers could make the argument that there were not safe alternative designs at the time of manufacturing.
Cyber liability
As cars become more interconnected and autonomous, the potential for hacking a car system to acquire data and cause harm poses a serious risk. For manufacturers and developers of autonomous technology, liability exposures arise from the collection and storage of data and personal information in the vehicle and in the cloud. Currently, manufacturers require indemnification from vendors and subcontractors (dealerships, repair/installation facilities, etc.) and this practice will likely be extended to autonomous technology developers.
Maps Autonomous car liability
Policy considerations
Manufacturers overbearing the costs
As argued in the article "The Coming Collision Between Autonomous Vehicles and the Liability System" by Gary Marchant and Rachel Lindor, it is impossible for a manufacturer to anticipate all possible scenarios that an autonomous car will encounter. While the manufacturer will design the system to minimize risks of situations that it does anticipate, the accidents that are most damaging and costly will be those that the manufacturer fails to anticipate. This leaves the manufacturer highly vulnerable to design defects, in particular the cost-benefit test.
In light of this, Marchant and Lindor argues that "the technology is potentially doomed...because the liability burden on the manufacturer may be prohibitive of further development. Thus, even though an autonomous vehicle may be safer overall than a conventional vehicle, it will shift the responsibility for accidents, and hence liability, from drivers to manufacturers. The shift will push the manufacturer away from the socially-optimal outcome--to develop the autonomous vehicle."
Consequently, policymakers need to be mindful of manufacturer overbearing the liability costs and the potential consequences that may result, such as higher consumer costs and delays in introducing autonomous car technology. In the report "Autonomous Vehicle Technology" by the Rand Corporation, the authors recommend that policymakers consider approaches such as tort preemption, a federal insurance backstop and long-term cost-benefit analysis of the legal standard for reasonableness. These approaches attempt to align the private and public costs of the autonomous car technology such that adoption is not unnecessarily delayed and one party does not overly-bear the costs.
Federal level legislation
Defining a clear role for the federal government as it relates to autonomous cars has been difficult but research groups have suggested potential options. In a report titled "Products Liability and Driverless Cars: Issues and Guiding Principles for Legislation," the Brookings Institution argues that the federal government should establish a nationally consistent set of safety regulations. The standards set at the federal level would provide state courts metrics and viewpoints that they can adopt in liability cases. Given the strong incentives for manufacturers to provide safe autonomous technology, the report further makes the point that a lack of specific minimum safety standards should not be a reason to put the autonomous car industry on hold.
Moreover, the report argues that congressional preemption of state tort remedies with respect to autonomous vehicle liability should not be undertaken. State courts have historically applied state tort remedies and that should be the case going forward with autonomous cars. While state court remedies may sometimes be inconsistent, the federal government should not put itself in the position of trying to formulate and impose a certain set of liability standards on the states.
Defining what choice an autonomous car must take in "the trolley problem" -- no-win hypothetical situation where a person witnessing a runaway trolley could allow it to hit several people or divert it, killing someone else, has proven to be a reoccurring problem for lawmakers
In a recent statement for automobile manufacturers by the U.S. Department of Transportation, it is consigned to a footnote that says only that ethical considerations are "important" and links to a brief acknowledgement that "no consensus around acceptable ethical decision-making" has been reached.
NHTSA guidelines
On September 2016, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration released a policy report to accelerate the adoption of autonomous car technology (or HAVs, highly automated vehicles) and provide guidelines for an initial regulatory framework. Summary of key points is provided below:
o States are responsible for determining liability rules for HAVs. States should consider how to allocate liability among HAV owners, operators, passengers, manufacturers, and others when a crash occurs.
o Determination of who or what is the "driver" of an HAV in a given circumstance does not necessarily determine liability for crashes involving that HAV.
o Rules and laws allocating tort liability could have a significant effect on both consumer acceptance of HAVs and their rate of deployment. Such rules also could have a substantial effect on the level and incidence of automobile liability insurance costs in jurisdictions in which HAVs operate.
o In the future, the States may identify additional liability issues and seek to develop consistent solutions. It may be desirable to create a commission to study liability and insurance issues and make recommendations to the States.
Liability clashing with current legislation
On 2012, the state of California's decision to implement sensors to determine fault whenever an autonomous vehicle crashes raises the question of who is liable for the damage. California clearly states that "the conversion of vehicles originally manufactured by a third party shall control issues of liability arising from the operation of the autonomous vehicle". Yet according to the same legislative council, this provision is in reconsideration. The Yale Journal of Law & Technology argues that this disagreement stems from policy's and overall regulators failure to separate freedom and privacy as 'nearly all' of the literature on self driving cars explores. Limiting liability to just manufacturers is not a popular option due to the very nature of the technology. According to Santa Clara Law Review, manufacturers could argue that such legislative intervention can negatively affect deployment and use of autonomous vehicles. This is because the technology represents a massive socially benefit that, at least at a theoretical level, would remove these liabilities altogether. Legislation would therefore eliminate any incentive for the manufacturers to make any improvements to the technology. In addition, making the manufacturer liable is not as simple as legislation makes it look like. As California's PATH Research Report argues: If a self driving vehicle causes any sort of accident, several entities can be held liable. These include the vehicle manufacturer, the manufacturer of the component, the software engineer who programmed the code for vehicle operation and even the road designer whose work helps control the vehicle.
H.R. 3388, the SELF DRIVE Act of 2017
The House of Representatives on September 6, 2017 unanimously passed H.R. 3388, the SELF DRIVE Act of 2017
oAdvance safety by prioritizing the protection of consumers.
oReaffirm the role and responsibilities of federal and state governments.
oUpdate the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards to account for advances in technology and the evolution of highly automated vehicles,
The Federal Government with the passing of the SELF DRIVE Act is limiting the role of States and this could signal a change in the future of liability laws. With the Federal Government also asserting that consumers will be protected, manufacturers may be at a liability disadvantage and stand to lose surplus. Updating the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards will have an impact on liability law. These laws will continue to protect the consumer while placing stricter standards on producers. The Federal Government has yet to announce any specific autonomous vehicular manslaughter liability laws. .
State level legislation
According to the NHTSA, states retain their responsibility for motor vehicle insurance and liability regimes, among other traditional responsibilities such as vehicle licensing and registration and traffic laws and enforcement. Several states, such as Michigan and Nevada, and Washington D.C. have explicitly written provisions for how liability will be treated.
Enacted autonomous vehicle legislation
Shift in auto insurance marketplace
In a white paper titled "Marketplace of Change: Automobile Insurance in the Era of Autonomous Vehicles," KPMG estimated that personal auto accounted for 87% of loss insurance, while commercial auto accounted for 13% in 2013. By 2040, personal auto is projected to fall to 58%, while commercial auto rises to 28% and products liability gains 14%. This reflects the view that personal liability will fall as the responsibility of driving shifts to the vehicle and that mobility on demand will take greater hold. In addition, with the view that the overall pie representing losses covered by liability policies will shrink as autonomous cars cause fewer accidents.
Although KPMG cautions that this elimination of excess capacity will bring about significant changes to the insurance industry, 32% of insurance firm leaders expect that driverless vehicles will have no material impact on the insurance industry over the next 10 years. Inaction by the large players has opened up opportunities for new entrants. For example, Metromile, an insurance provider start-up founded in 2011, has started to offer usage-based insurance for low-mileage drivers and designed a policy to complement the commercial coverage of Uber drivers.
Public statements from car manufacturers
In 2015, Volvo issued a press release claiming that Volvo would accept full liability whenever its cars in autonomous mode. President and Chief Executive of Volvo Cars Håkan Samuelsson went further urging "regulators to work closely with car makers to solve controversial outstanding issues such as questions over legal liability in the event that a self-driving car is involved in a crash or hacked by a criminal third party."
In an IEEE article, the senior technical leader for safety and driver support technologies at Volvo echoed a similar sentiment saying, "if we made a mistake in designing the brakes or writing the software, it is not reasonable to put the liability on the customer...we say to the customer, you can spend time on something else, we take responsibility."
See also
- History of autonomous cars
References
Source of the article : Wikipedia
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