Byford Dolphin is a semi-submersible, column-stable drilling rig operated by Dolphin Drilling, a Fred. Subsidiary of Olsen Energy, and in 2009 was contracted by BP for drilling in the British Empire in the North Sea for three years. It's registered in Hamilton, Bermuda. The rig has suffered several serious accidents, particularly explosive decompression in 1983 that killed four divers and one dive tender, and severely injured another dive tender.
Video Byford Dolphin
Description
Byford Dolphin Drilling rig is an Enhanced Aker H-3 design built by Aker Group at the Aker Verdal shipyard in 1974. Between 1974 and 1978, it was named Deep Sea Driller b> .
Byford Dolphin has 108.2 meters (355Ã, ft) long, 67.4 meters wide (221Ã, ft) and a depth of 36.6 meters (120Ã, ft). It has a maximum drilling depth of 6,100 meters (20,000 feet), and can operate at a water depth of 460 meters (1,500 feet). As a drilling rig, Byford Dolphin is equipped with advanced drilling equipment and must meet the level of strict certification under Norwegian law. Byford Dolphin can maneuver with its own engine (to counter current and ocean currents), but for remote relocation it must be moved by a special tugboat.
Maps Byford Dolphin
Accidents and incidents
Deep Sea Driller
On March 1, 1976, the rig foundered in transit from a block in the North Sea to Bergen. All the crew were evacuated in the boat of life, but six people were killed when they fell from the boat of their life.
Sled accidents
On November 5, 1983 at 4:00 AM, while drilling at the Frigg gas field in the Norwegian sector in the North Sea, four divers were in a decompression space system attached by a rod (short section) to a diving bell on the rig. The divers are Edwin Coward (England, 35 years), Roy Lucas (UK, 38), BjÃÆ'¸rn GiÃÆ'Âverver Bergersen (Norway, 29) and Truls Hellevik (Norway, 34). They were assisted by two diving tenders, Crammond and Saunders.
Hellevik wants to close the door between the space system and the rod when the explosive space is decompressed from the pressure of nine atmospheres into one atmosphere. One of the tenders, William Crammond, 32 years from the United Kingdom, and the four diver died instantly; Another tender, Saunders, was seriously injured.
The situation just prior to this accident is as follows: Decompression chamber 1 and 2 connect via rod to diving bell. This connection is sealed by a clamp operated by two tenders, who are also experienced divers. The third space is connected to this system but not involved. On this day, Coward and Lucas are resting in room 2 at a pressure of 9 atm. Diving bells with Bergersen and Hellevik have just been won after diving and joining the luggage. Letting their wet teeth in the trunk, the diver climbs through the trunk to room 1.
The normal procedure should be:
- Close the door bell.
- The diving supervisor will then slightly increase the pressure of the bell to close this door tightly.
- Close the door between the trunk and space 1.
- Slowly depressurize the trunk to 1 atmosphere.
- Open the clamp to separate the bell from the chamber system.
The first two steps have been completed when, for unknown reasons, one of the tenders (Crammond) opens the clamp before Diver 4 (Hellevik) can close the door to the room. This results in an explosive decompression of unclosed space. The air rushed out of the room with tremendous force, pressed the door of the interior trunk and pushed the bell away, hitting both tenders. Tenders that opened the clamps were killed while others were seriously injured.
Coward, Lucas, and Bergersen were affected by explosive decompression and died in the position indicated by the diagram. Subsequent investigations by forensic pathologists determined that Hellevik, exposed to the highest pressure gradient and in the process of moving to secure the inner door, was forced through a 60 cm (24 inch) diameter opening made by an interior trunk door jammed by escaping air. and roughly chop, including dividing his thoracoabdominal cavity, which further leads to the expulsion of all the internal organs of the chest and abdomen, except the trachea and small intestine, and thoracic spine. It is projected some distance, one part later found 10 meters (30 feet) vertical above the exterior pressure door.
Medical findings
Medical investigations were conducted on four divers. The most noticeable autopsy findings are the large amounts of fat in the large arteries and veins and in the heart chambers, as well as the intravascular fat in the organs, especially the liver. This fat may not be embolized, but must be precipitated from the blood in situ . It is recommended that the formation of rapid bubbles in the blood denatures the lipoprotein complex, making the lipids insoluble. The death of three divers remaining intact in the room will be very fast because the circulation is immediate and completely stopped. The fourth diver was cut into pieces and mutilated by an explosion that forced it out through a partially obstructed door and would die instantaneously.
Investigation
The committee investigating the accident concluded that it was caused by human error on the part of the diving tender that opened the clamp. It is unclear whether the tender that opens the clamps before the trunk is depreciated does so on the orders of his superiors, on his own initiative, or because of miscommunication. At that moment, the only communication the tender made outside the room system was through loudspeakers stuck to the wall; with the swift sound of rigs and the sea, it's hard to hear what's going on. Fatigue from many hours of hard work also brought casualties among divers, who often worked for 16 hours. Modifications to the "overtime use" policy were made as a result of further investigation into this incident.
This incident is also associated with technical failure. The Byford Dolphin outdated buffer system, originating from 1975, does not come with a fail-safe hatching, sticky pressure gauge, and interlocking mechanism, which will prevent baggage from opening when the system is under pressure. Prior to the accident, Norske Veritas has issued the following rules for certification: "The bridging mechanism between the bell and the chamber must be regulated so that it can not operate when the luggage is pressed," thus requiring the system to have an insecure and secure seal. interlocking mechanism. One month after the accident, Norske Veritas and the Norwegian oil directorate made the final rule for all bell systems.
Among others, former members of the Byford Dolphin crew and NOPEF (the Norwegian oil and petro-chemical union) have advanced and claim that the investigation is a cover. They claimed that the commission investigating the accident did not mention in their report the irresponsible dispensation of Comex's vital equipment requested by the division to the Norwegian Directorate of Petroleum, which played a key role in the incident. They also suspect the accident was caused by a lack of proper equipment, including clamping mechanisms equipped with an interlocking mechanism (which is impossible to open when the room system is under pressure), outboard pressure gauges, and secure communication systems, all of which have been withheld dispensed by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate.
Post-investigation
The conclusion of the investigation was disputed, and a group of divers collected evidence with the aim of "finding justice for all Byford Dolphin crew." This group formed the North Sea Turtle Alliance in the early 1990s and is now a campaign for compensation for scuba divers killed or injured in the Norwegian Sector in the North Sea.
Subsequent demands
The North Sea Diver Alliance, formed by early North Sea divers and their dead relatives, continued to press for further investigation and, in February 2008, obtained a report indicating the true cause was the wrong equipment. Clare Lucas, the daughter of Roy Lucas, said: "I would say further that the Norwegian Government killed my father because they knew they were diving with an unsafe decompression room." The divers family finally received compensation for damages from the Norwegian government 26 years after the incident.
Other incidents
On April 17, 2002, a 44-year-old Norwegian worker on the rig was hit in the head and killed in an industrial accident. The accident resulted in Byford Dolphin losing an exploration contract with Statoil, who expressed concerns with rig surgery procedures. The incident was costing the company millions of dollars in lost revenue.
See also
- Dive offshore commercial
- diving saturation
- Piper Alpha oil production platform
- Pioneer , a fictional film set in the Norwegian oil industry of the 1970s, and featuring a fatal decompression space crash and its cover
References
Further reading
- Gjerde, Kristin ÃÆ'ËÅ"ye; Ryggvik, Helge (2009). NordsjÃÆ'¸dykkerne [ North Sea Diver ] (in Norwegian). Stavanger: Wigestrand Forlag . Retrieved July 14 2010 . Ã, - Documentation of offshore divers and pioneer divers on the Norwegian continental shelf; contains a section on security and responsibility
- Haddow, Iain (March 27, 2008). The experimental pig "underwater Norway" ' ". BBC News Magazine British Broadcasting Corporation . Retrieved July 14 2010 . Ã, - News reports about Byford Dolphin and other incidents in the North Sea
Source of the article : Wikipedia
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