The Firestone and Ford tire controversy is a very high failure period of the ATX, ATX II, AT and II ATLT and ATV AT tires mounted on Ford Explorer and other related vehicles.
Failure of tires is linked to 271 casualties and more than eight hundred injuries in the United States with more injuries and international casualties, causing Bridgestone/Firestone and Ford Motor Company to withdraw and replace 23 million tires, it cuts Bridgestone's market value Firestone shut down the Decatur, Illinois plant where the tires were manufactured, some executives at Bridgestone and Ford resigned or were fired, it caused Congress to pass the TREAD Act, and that ended a nearly 100 year corporate relationship between Ford Motor Company and Firestone.
Video Firestone and Ford tire controversy
Detecting problem
In early 1996, a personal injury lawyer was aware of accidents, injuries and deaths caused by Firestone tire treads that broke away from tires at high speed. Traffic safety lawyers and researchers decided not to contact the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) because they lacked trust in agents and feared that the investigation might conclude that there were no defects at the expense of personal injury lawsuits. All but 13 of the 271 fatalities from these tires occurred after 1996.
In 1996, the State of Arizona told Firestone that the tire tread was parted at high temperatures. Firestone sent several engineers to inspect the tires and concluded that normal passenger tires are used in harsh conditions, on dirt roads, off roads, and under heavy loads. Firestone replaces the tires with heavy duty tires.
Firestone Internal Documents showed an increase in injury claims for ATX, ATX II, and Wilderness AT tires in early 1997.
In July 1998, Samuel Boyden, a researcher for State Agricultural Insurance, received a call from a claim handler requesting information about the separation of Firestone tire tread. Boyden found 21 cases of accidents caused by site separation and forwarded information to NHTSA. In 1999, he found 30 additional cases and forwarded the information to NHTSA.
Sean Kane, a researcher at Strategic Safety Consulting, found a document showing that Ford had replaced Firestone tires in Venezuela beginning in 1998 in which 46 deaths had occurred. Firestone was aware of tire defects in Venezuela in early 1999.
Ford dealers in Saudi Arabia saw the high levels of Firestone tire failures in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait starting in 1997 and in July 1999 began replacing Firestone tires on unsold Ford Explorers and offered a 75% discount for replacement tires when customers came for maintenance. Ford and Firestone began to test the tires in late 1997 or 1998 and started limited withdrawals in the Middle East, Venezuela, Malaysia and Thailand in 1999 and spring of 2000 but did not notify NHTSA.
On February 7, 2000, KHOU-TV in Houston Texas included a 9-minute story of Firestone's high speed failure at Ford Explorers causing 30 deaths. KHOU is overwhelmed by phone calls from concerned citizens and begins to direct callers to contact NHTSA.
Clarence Ditlow, Executive Director for the Automatic Safety Center, stated before the Senate Committee on Trade, Science and Transport that "Emerging Information shows that Ford and Firestone had initial knowledge about the separation of treads in Ban Firestone fitted to Ford Explorer vehicles, but not it's useful to tell NHTSA about their findings ".
Firestone has more information about tire failures than Ford because of its warranty claims, but Firestone never acted on this information because it always blames consumers for not maintaining their tires properly or operating their vehicles in extreme environments, leading to these failures. When Ford or NHTSA noticed concerns about tire or rollover failures, they always consulted consumer complaints against NHTSA toll-free hotlines. Consumer complaints do not reflect the size of the problem because lawyers and their clients almost completely stop using the hotline to report tire failures or other complaints.
Maps Firestone and Ford tire controversy
Investigation and Possible Cause
On March 6, 2000 NHTSA commenced its initial investigation and on May 2, NHTSA initiated an investigation (PE00-020) regarding the high incidence of tire failures and the Ford Explorers accident and other light trucks and SUVs equipped with Firestone Radial ATX, ATX II and tires Wilderness. On August 9, Firestone withdrew all ATX and ATX II tires and all AT Wilderness tires manufactured in Decatur, IL. On August 31, 2000, the Office of Crippled Investigation (ODI) increased the investigation into Technical Analysis (EA00-023) to determine whether Firestone withdrawal included all damaged tires.
Ford and Firestone both published root problem analysis into NHTSA. Firestone believes that vehicle weight, tire design, suggested low inflation pressure, and lower tire attachment for tires manufactured in Decatur, IL factories contribute to tire failures. Ford argues that tire designs lead to higher operating temperatures compared to similar tires manufactured by Goodyear and that differences in manufacturing in Decatur lead to weaker tires that are more susceptible to failure. Ford also believes that the size of the wedge, the rubber piece between the first and second belts, is smaller on Firestone tires than on Michelin tires that make it weaker than comparable Michelin tires.
Firestone publicly believes that Ford's recommended inflation pressure of 26 psi is too low and should be 30 psi. In addition Firestone believes that Explorer is dangerously abnormal and vulnerable to rollover in case of tire failure, which causes more injuries and fatalities. In the words of Firestone CEO John Lampe, "When a vehicle driver has something going on like a separation site, they should be able to pull over instead of rollover."
Ford argues that Explorer is no more dangerous than other SUVs and that the accident rate for Explorers with Goodyear tires is much lower than for Explorers with Firestone tires. Ford also believes that something is wrong with the Firestone tire design and with the manufacture of the tire in the Decatur, IL plant.
Some outside observers have speculated on the feasibility of blaming both sides; Firestone tires are susceptible to site separation and failure, and Explorer is particularly vulnerable to roll over if the tires fail at speed compared to other vehicles.
Ford Explorer
Ford Explorer was first offered for sale in March 1990. Explorer was originally designed by taking the SUV cabin and attaching it to the Ford Ranger undercarriage. This cuts out the cost of producing a new Explorer because Ford can use existing facilities, components, and robots and does not need to design everything from scratch. This creates a problem. Because the Explorer is taller like a pickup truck, it has a higher center of gravity and is more likely to roll over in case of an accident. It is also more likely to shake during sharp turns because it uses the same leaf spring suspension found on the Ranger. The likelihood of accidents and the possibility of injury and death due to accidents is greater in the separated SUV compared to the pickup truck.
Ford gave three options to fix this problem; using shorter suspension springs to lower the vehicle half an inch in front and 1 inch behind, lowering the tire pressure to give Explorer a more car-like journey, or widen the wheelbase by two inches that would involve substantial redesign. After Explorer rolled in the test company before Ford's production decided to lower the suspension and remove the air from the tire to 26 psi compared with 35 psi for the same tire on the Ranger. They do not expand the wheelbase. One consequence of lowering tire pressure is an increase in tire temperature which can lead to tire failure. Firestone guarantees this tire at 26 psi for 11 years.
The first generation Explorer has one of the lowest fuel economy ratings for every SUV available in the United States, partly due to Ford's recommended tire pressure. To fix the problem, Ford reduced the amount of material on the Explorer roof for the second generation that went on sale in 1995. The lighter roof is so weak that it will collapse under the reverse Explorer's weight if its windshield is destroyed. in, a condition that often occurs in a rollover accident. In addition Ford replaced the suspension Twin I-Beam with a lighter suspension lighter and longer sleeves, but did not lower the engine. This has the effect of increasing Explorer's gravity center so it's more prone to roll over in a crash or a sharp turn.
After Ford Motor Company voluntarily recalled 13 million Firestone tires on May 21, 2001, Firestone requested that NHTSA investigate the handling and safety of Ford Explorers after the separation of the site. Firestone argues that Explorer was poorly designed and showed a dangerous oversteer in a suspect event that the tire failed while driving. Firestone hired a consultant engineer to analyze the performance of Ford Explorer and other SUVs during site separation, the report indicates that Explorer has a greater propensity for oversteer after split footprint than other SUVs. NHTSA reviewed this report as well as real-world accident data and data provided by Ford regarding the Explorer design and rejected Firestone's request. NHTSA states that "[t] he had many accidents following the separation of tire treads on these vehicles documented in the Firestone claims database and which have been reported to ODI by consumers and others suggest that such tire failures may cause loss of control, especially when the rear tires fails and the vehicle is being driven at high speed.However, the fact that the vehicle shows the linear oversteer characteristics of the range after the rear tire separation tread does not, by itself, indicate that the vehicle contains In addition, the data available for ODI does not show that Explorers... is more likely to show the oversteer characteristics of the linear range after the rear tire separation rather than many of their counterparts. "
The Explorer was redesigned for the 2002 model year. The tire pressure was increased to 30 psi, widened by 2.5 inches, lowered suspension, and independent rear suspension and added electronic stability control.
Ban Firestone
Separation Tread
The failure of all involved the separation site where the tire treads chipped lead tire was destroyed. Separation of site, due to the interaction of steel elements and rubber tires, has been a challenge in radial tire design since it was developed by Michelin in 1946.
The subject tire failure "started as a belt-edge separation at the edge of the second belt.This is the highest strain area in steel radial steel tires, mainly because of structural discontinuities created by sudden changes in the modulus of steel for rubber." Once the separation of the tread begins to grow along the circumference of the tire or laterally in the width of the tire that leads to the crack growing between the belts. As the separation continues, it can grow to form a large crescent-shaped area along either or both sides of the tire. If the area grows large enough they can split simultaneously, especially at high speeds where the separation is aided by the centrifugal force of the spinning tire.
While the tread separates from the tire the vehicle will pull towards the side of the vehicle with a failed tire. The longer it takes the tread to separate the more vehicles pulling in that direction. After the separation of the tread is complete, the vehicle stops pulling in all directions. While the tread that separates the vehicle will be oversteer while the tire separating the treads is outside the turn.
In 2000, Firestone added a nylon cap to reduce the separation problem of treads on all models of tires mounted in SUVs.
Cause
There are several major causes of site segregation; tire life, manufacturing facility, operating temperature, and vehicle weight.
In court cases, retired Firestone workers testified that workers should check as many as 100 tires per hour that they believe there are too many tires to do adequate work. They also testified that they were told to use benzene on a tire adhesive that had lost its footing from sitting for too long. Benzene can damage the material in the tire.
United Rubber Workers Strike
The failed tires are mainly manufactured in Firestone's Decatur, Illinois factory during times of labor unrest and strikes against Firestone conducted by the United Rubber Workers Union (URW) and United Steel Workers (USW).
In January 1994, Firestone and URW entered into new contract negotiations with Firestone demanding major concessions from unions. These concessions include switching from 8 hours to 12 hours of alternating shifts so that factories can keep operating 24 hours a day, 30 percent pay cuts for new employees, seven days a week instead of five days, workers every hour will contribute their health care plans, switching from wage system per unit to performance based system, and senior worker must lose two weeks vacation time.
In April 1994 the existing labor contract expired and workers continued to work in the factory until URW conducted a general strike in July in Decatur and four other Firestone facilities. Almost immediately Firestone began recruiting replacement workers in all of their facilities and by January 1995 Firestone had hired 2,300 replacement workers who were paid thirty percent less. Over time, unions began to cross the picket line and by May 1995 there were 1,048 replacement workers and 371 permanent workers in Decatur. At that time, URW voted to end the strike unconditionally to block Firestone from hiring more replacement workers and then holding trade union elections. While the strike ended, labor negotiations continued. In July 1995, URW had run out of money and was absorbed by USW. During the time period from May 1995 and December 1996 union workers worked with non-union substitutes. Labor negotiations between Firestone and USW continue but many union workers are unable to return to work because their work has been replaced. The Society described the period of time as "brutal." The USW continues to negotiate specifically trying to get Firestone to allow all union workers to return to their jobs. In December 1996, USW finally reached an agreement and all union workers were allowed to return to work.
The tires with the highest failure rate were produced in the months before the union broke down but after labor negotiations began and then after the union began to cross the picket line and worked without a contract with a replacement worker. Other Firestone factories (Joliette, Quebec and Wilson, North Carolina) also produce the same tire model but have a much lower failure rate. The failure rate at the Decatur plant before labor negotiations begins, while replacement workers work without union, and after labor negotiations end up proportional to the rate of tire failure produced at Joliette and Wilson plants.
Other studies have found that employee anxiety reduces the quality of work performed by union members who suggest that there should be additional inspections and enhanced supervision by regulators during the strike.
Call back
On August 17, 1999 Ford in Saudi Arabia began replacing Firestone tires on unsold Ford Explorers and to offer substantial discounts on replacement tires to returning customers to Ford dealers for routine maintenance. While this is not officially considering Ford is still replacing Firestone tires at 6,800 Ford Explorers and Mercury Mountaineers.
In February 2000 Ford began recalling Firestone tires in Malaysia and Thailand.
In May, 2000 Ford attracted 150,000 Firestone tires at Explorers in Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador. In August 2000, Bridgestone/Firestone issued a withdrawal in Venezuela of 62,000 Venezuelan tires. The withdrawal is estimated to cost $ 6 million.
On August 9, 2000 Firestone issued a withdrawal covering 6.5 million P235/75 R15 Firestone ATX and ATX II tires and P235/75R15 Wilderness AT tires manufactured after 1991 and 1996 respectively. The recall includes all ATX and ATX II tires regardless of where they originated, but only includes AT Wilderness tires from the Firestone Decatur plant. Firestone has produced 14.4 million tires covered by this recall but it is estimated that only 6.5 million euros are still operating. Wilderness AT tires manufactured in Joliette, Quebec and Wilson, North Carolina are not included in the recall. On August 21, 2000, Ford stopped production at three truck assembly plants so that 70,000 tires could be diverted towards recall. The P235/75 R15 tires became scarce and Ford's authorized dealers installed replacement tires from companies other than Firestone. Both Ford and Firestone are looking for replacement tires internationally.
On May 22, 2001 Ford announced the voluntary recall of all the 15, 16 and 17 inch Wilderness tires mounted in all Ford and SUV trucks. It includes 13 million additional Firestone tires and Ford's $ 3 billion cost.
On 4 October 2001, NHTSA issued a mandatory withdrawal of 3.5 million P235/75R15 and P255/70R16 Wilderness ATs manufactured before May 1998 installed at the Joliette, Quebec or Wilson, NC plant. The recall removes all remaining Wilderness AT tires manufactured before May 1998. NHTSA concludes that rubber gaps between the outer edges of the two belts are not thick enough on the AT Wilderness tires and are not strong enough to withstand the formation and growth of cracks. Wilderness AT tires manufactured after May 1998 have thicker slices making them stronger.
In November 2013, two ATL drawn Wilderness tires were found in Atlanta, Georgia. One of the tires was offered for sale as a new item at a used tire retail store.
Fallout
Injury and Death
Two hundred and seventy-one people were killed and 823 were injured in the United States as a result of this failure. Most of the accidents occurred in California, Arizona, Texas, and Florida. An additional 46 people were killed in Venezuela.
Congress started the hearing in September 2000 to find out why it took so long for NHTSA to discover this tire defect and why Ford and Firestone were aware of the tire failure in early 1996 but never reported the information to NHTSA. The inquiry led to the Congress to continue the Increase of Transport Withdrawal, Accountability and Documentation or the TREAD Act on October 11, 2000 which was signed into law on 1 November.
Ford/Firestone company relationship
The relationship between Ford and Bridgestone/Firestone deteriorated after NHTSA began investigating tire failures in May 2000. Ford first accused Firestone of withholding the data Ford needed to determine which tires might be unsafe. Firestone later accused Ford of holding security data on the Explorer design. After Firestone approved the early withdrawal of 14.4 million tires on August 9, 2000, NHTSA continued to push Firestone to recall all ATX tires, ATX II, and AT Wilderness regardless of where they were manufactured. Ford executives are concerned that NHTSA might decide that AT Wilderness tires will not meet future safety standards and decide to pull back this tire themselves. Before Ford publicly announced this decision John T. Lampe (Chairman & CEO of Bridgestone/Firestone) announced on May 21, 2001 in an open letter to Jacques Nasser (head of the Ford Motor Company company) that Bridgestone/Firestone will no longer go inside a new contract with Ford Motor Company, which effectively ends a 100-year supply relationship. The letter includes allegations that Ford Explorer is unsafe and asks NHTSA to investigate design flaws in the SUV. On May 22, 2001, outraged that Firestone will not extend the withdrawal, Jacques Nasser at Ford announced a voluntary recall of all AT Wilderness tires that were not subject to recall.
Corporate Firm and Resignation
Bridgestone/Firestone Chairman and CEO, Masatoshi Ono, resigned in October 2000 and was replaced by John Lampe. In January 2001, Bridgestone's CEO and president, Yoichiro Kaizaki, resigned and was replaced by Shigeo Watanabe. The fierce public battle between Ford and Firestone was also a contributing factor in Ford's decision to sack Jacques Nasser in November 2001. Nasser was replaced by William Clay Ford Jr., great-granddaughter of Henry Ford, founder of Ford Motor Company, and great-grandson of Harvey Firestone, founder of Firestone Tire and Rubber Company.
Plant Decatur Firestone
The Firestone Decatur factory closed in December 2001 and all 1,500 employees were laid off. Firestone cites the decline in consumer demand for Firestone tires and the age of the Decatur plant as an excuse to close the facility. It is estimated that the factory cost Decatur Bridgestone/Firestone $ 210 million.
Financial Cost
It is estimated that Bridgestone/Firestone's tire failure and rollover costs $ 1.67 billion and Ford Motor Company $ 530 million. Bridgestone's market price fell 50% and restructuring costs generated Bridgestone $ 2 billion. In 2001 Ford posted a $ 5.5 billion loss.
See also
References
Further reading
External links
- NHTSA Information about Firestone Tire Recall
- Public Citizens: Ford Firestone Win Back
- TREAD Act
- HOUSE HEARING, THE 106 CONTACTS - THE RECENT FIRESTONE TIRE RECALL ACTION, FOCUSING ON THE ACTION AS IT IS VALUABLE TO RELEVANT FORD VEHICLES
- SENATE HEARING 106-1141 - FIRESTONE PLAYS
- HOUSE HEARING, CONGRESS 107 - MOTORCYCLE COMPANY FORD OF OF CERTAIN FIRESTONE FEATURES
- CSPAN Video - House Hearing, 106th Congress - Energy and Commerce Committee, 21 September 2000
- CSPAN Video - House Hearing, 106th Congress - House Commerce Subcommittees, September 6, 2000 - Part 1
- CSPAN Video - House Hearing, 106th Congress - House Commerce Subcommittees, September 6, 2000 - Part 2
- CSPAN Video - Senate Session, 106th Congress - Senate Committee on Trade, Science and Transportation, 12 September 2000
- CSPAN Video - House Hearing, 107th Congress - House of Commerce & Energy Commission, June 19, 2001
Source of the article : Wikipedia
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