On September 26, 1983, the Soviet Union's nuclear warning system reported the launch of several USAF inter-continental ballistic missiles from US bases. The warning of the missile attack was correctly identified as a false alarm by Stanislav Yevgrafovich Petrov, a Soviet Air Defense Force officer. This decision is deemed to have prevented a retaliatory nuclear attack based on false data about the United States and its NATO allies, which might lead to an immediate escalation of the cold war to full-scale nuclear war. The investigation of the satellite warning system then confirms that the system has functioned.
Video 1983 Soviet nuclear false alarm incident
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The incident occurred during a very tense relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. In response to the Soviet spreading of the fourteen SS-20/RSD-10 nuclear missiles, the NATO Double Decision was taken in December 1979 by the NATO military commander to deploy 108 Pershing II nuclear missiles in Western Europe with the ability to reach targets in eastern Ukraine, Belarus or Lithuania within 10 minutes and longer range, but slower BGM-109G Ground launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) to attack potential targets further east. In mid-February 1981, and continuing until 1983, psychological operations by the United States began. It was designed to test the vulnerability of Soviet radar and to demonstrate US nuclear capability. They include clandestine naval operations, in the Barents Sea, Norway, Black and Baltic and near the Greenland-Iceland-British Empire (GIUK) slit, as well as flights by American bombers, sometimes several times per week, directly into Soviet airspace. turned only at the last moment.
"That's really for them," said Dr. William Schneider, a former deputy minister of state for military and technological assistance, who saw classified "reports after action" indicating U.S. flight activity "They do not know what all that means, the squadrons will fly directly into Soviet airspace, and other radar will go on and the units will be on alert, then in the last minute the squadron will peel and go back home."
From the CIA report and the KGB senior officer, in May 1981, obsessed with historical alignment with 1941 and Reagan's rhetoric, and without defensive ability against Pershing II, Soviet leaders believed the United States was preparing a secret nuclear strike on the Soviet Union and initiating RYaN Operation. Below, overseas agencies monitor the services and technical personnel who will impose a nuclear attack in order to advance it or have a mutually agreed destruction.
On September 1, 1983 the Soviet military fired down a South Korean passenger jet, Korean Air Lines Flight 007, which had sped into Soviet airspace. All 269 people on board were killed, including US Congressman Larry McDonald and many other Americans. The first Mishing Pershing II was reportedly deployed in late November 1983.
Bruce Blair, a Cold War strategist and former president of the World Security Institute in Washington, D.C., said the US-Soviet relations at the time
has deteriorated to the point where the Soviet Union as a system - not just the Kremlin, not just Soviet leader Yuri Andropov, not just the KGB - but as a system, is directed to expect attacks and reply very quickly to it.. It is a hair trigger warning. It is very nervous and prone to errors and accidents. The fake alarms that occurred in Petrov's watch were unlikely to come at a more dangerous and intense phase in US-Soviet relations.
In an interview broadcast on American television, Blair said, "Russia (Soviet) sees the US government preparing its first strike, led by President Ronald Reagan who is able to order the first attack." Regarding the incident involving Petrov, he said, "I think this is the closest that our country has come to an unintentional nuclear war."
Maps 1983 Soviet nuclear false alarm incident
Incident
On September 26, 1983, Stanislav Petrov, a lieutenant colonel in the Soviet Air Defense Force, was an officer in charge of the Serpukhov-15 bunker near Moscow that became the Soviet early warning satellite command center, code-name Oko. Petrov's responsibilities include observing a satellite early warning network and notifying his superiors of any future nuclear missile attacks against the Soviet Union. If a notice is received from an early warning system that an inbound missile has been detected, the Soviet Union strategy is a direct and mandatory counterattack against the United States (warning launch), determined in mutually convincing doctrine.
Shortly after midnight, the bunker computer reported that an intercontinental ballistic missile was heading for the Soviet Union from the United States. Petrov considers the detection of computer errors, since the first-attack nuclear strike by the United States will likely involve hundreds of simultaneous launch missiles to disable Soviet means of counterattack. Furthermore, the reliability of satellite systems has been questioned in the past. Petrov dismissed the warning as a false alarm, although the report of the incident was different as to whether he notified his boss or not after he concluded that the computer detection was wrong and no missiles were launched. Petrov's suspicion that the warning system was broken has been confirmed when no missiles in fact arrive. Later, the computer identified four additional missiles in the air, all directed to the Soviet Union. Petrov suspects that the computer system does not work anymore, although it has no direct way to confirm this. Soviet land radars are unable to detect missiles beyond the horizon.
It was then determined that a false alarm was caused by the rare alignment of sunlight in high altitude clouds and the orbit of Molniya satellites, the error was then corrected by cross reference of the geostationary satellite.
In explaining the factors that led to his decision, Petrov cited his beliefs and training that every first strike of the US would be enormous, so five missiles seemed an illogical start. In addition, the launch detection system is new and in its view has not been entirely reliable, while ground radar has failed to take corroborating evidence even after a few minutes of false alarms.
Aftermath
Petrov underwent intense interrogation by his superiors about his actions. Initially, he was praised for his decision. General Yury Votintsev, commander of the Soviet Air Defense Missile Defense Unit, who first heard Petrov's report on the incident (and first revealed it to the public in the 1990s), stated that Petrov's "right action" was "duly recorded." Petrov himself claims he was initially praised by Votintsev and promised a reward, but recalls that he was also reprimanded for improper document submissions under the pretext that he did not describe the incident in the military diary.
He did not receive a gift. According to Petrov, this is because the incidents and other bugs found in the missile detection system embarrass his superiors and the influential scientists responsible for it, so if he is officially rewarded, they should be punished. He was transferred to a less sensitive post, taking early retirement (though he emphasized that he was not "forced out" of the army, as sometimes claimed by Western sources), and suffered from a nervous breakdown.
Oleg Kalugin, the former head of the foreign counter-intelligence KGB who knows Soviet chairman Andropov, said that Andropov's distrust of American leaders is huge. It is conceivable that if Petrov had stated the satellite warning was valid, such erroneous reports could provoke the Soviet leadership to become a fraud. Kalugin said, "The danger exists in Soviet leadership thinking, 'America may attack, so we better attack first.'"
The incident was publicly known in the 1990s after the publication of the Votintsev memoir. Widespread media reports since then have raised public awareness of Petrov's actions.
In popular culture
- The incident was broadcast on the first episode of the 2010 American web series Pioneer One .
- The false alarm incident was depicted in feature movie 2014 The Man Who Saved the World .
- The incident was also mentioned on November 1, 2015, episode # 2.5 of the US television show Madam Secretary.
- Oleg Burov tells the story of a false alarm on episode 48, "The Day After," from the period drama spy, The Americans.
- The Doctor Who's audio story Protect and End takes place in alternative history where Stanislav Petrov, controlled by Elder Gods, launches a 'secondary' nuclear attack
- In 2017 Ubisoft's Assassin's Creed Origins video game, one of several ancient mechanisms scattered around the globe, refers to the incident as one of a series of events leading to the edge of the world.
- In the 2015 Konami video game Metal Gear Solid V: The Phantom Pain, this incident is mentioned by the Soviet NPC soldiers that can be heard by players.
See also
- Able Archer 83 - NATO military exercises that occurred more than a month after the Petrov incident
- Deutschland 83
- List of nuclear short-range calls
- 2018 Hawaii missile warning - a similar incident in which fake ballistic missile warnings are issued in the US state of Hawaii
- Norwegian rocket events - rockets carrying scientific equipment to study aurora borealis resembling Trident missiles launched by submarines
- Vasili Arkhipov - another nuclear war deterrent during the Cuban Missile Crisis
- WarGames - a 1983 film released four months before the incident, describing the false alarm of an early warning system of a thermonuclear strike
- World War III - The situation that resulted in a close encounter of the third world war
- 1961 Goldsboro B-52 accident - another nuclear accident that almost lost its widespread destruction
References
External links
- BrightStarSound.com Stanislav Petrov tribute website, some pages with photos and reprint articles about Petrov
- Nuclear War: Minuteman article from Weekendavisen , April 2, 2004.
- The Nuclear War that Almost Happened in 1983 (posted September 5, 2003). News News Network , originally at Baltimore Sun on August 31, 2003 The
- Armageddon Almost Not Averted link died on September 30, 2013
- "September 26, 1983: The Man Who Saved the World by Doing... Nothing".
- 30 years on: The day when computer errors almost led to World War III. The Register . 27 September 2013
Source of the article : Wikipedia
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