In social psychology, basic attribution error ( FAE ), also known as correspondence bias or attribution influence , is a claim which is different from their own behavioral interpretation, people place undue emphasis on the agent's internal characteristics (character or intent), rather than external factors, in explaining the behavior of others. The effect is described as "the tendency to believe that what people do reflects who they are".
Video Fundamental attribution error
Origin of terms and examples
The phrase was coined by Lee Ross several years after the classical experiments by Edward E. Jones and Victor Harris (1967). Ross argues in a popular paper that fundamental attribution errors form a conceptual basis for the field of social psychology. Jones writes that he found Ross's phrase "too provocative and somewhat misleading", and also joked: "Besides, I'm angry because I did not think about it first." Some psychologists, including Daniel Gilbert, have used the phrase "bias correspondence" for fundamental attributional errors. Other psychologists argue that fundamental attributional errors and correspondence biases are related but independent phenomena, with the former being a general explanation for the latter.
As a simple example of the behavioral attribution error theory that seeks to explain, consider the situation in which Alice, a driver, is disconnected in traffic by Bob. Alice attributes Bob's behavior to his fundamental personality, e.g. she only thinks of herself, she's selfish, she's a jerk, she's an unskilled driver; he did not think it was situational, for example he would miss his flight, his wife gave birth at the hospital, his daughter was cramped in school. Consider also the situation in which Alice makes the same mistake and argues herself by saying that she is influenced by situational causes, ie. I was late for my job interview, I had to pick up my son for a dentist's appointment; he does not think he has a defect in his internal characteristics, eg I am a jerk, I treat others with disgust, I am bad in driving.
Classical demonstration studies: Jones and Harris (1967)
Jones and Harris hypothesized, based on the correspondent's conclusion theory, that people would associate behavior that seemed to be freely chosen for disposition and apparently behavior-oriented situations. The hypothesis is confounded by fundamental attributional errors.
The subjects in the experiment read the essay for and against Fidel Castro and were asked to rate Pro-Castro's attitude from the authors. When the subjects believed that the authors were free to choose a position for or against Castro, they usually judged those who spoke favoring Castro had a more positive attitude towards Castro. However, contrary to the original hypothesis of Jones and Harris, when subjects were told that the author's position was determined by the tossing of coins, they still judged the author who spoke in favor of Castro having an average, more positive attitude towards Castro than those who spoke against it. In other words, the subject can not see correctly the effect of situational constraints placed on the author; they can not help but link their sincere beliefs with the authors. Therefore the experimental group provides more internal attribution to the authors.
Maps Fundamental attribution error
Test error
The hypothesis that people tend to over-attribute behavior with traits, or at least do it for other people's behavior, has been contested. For example Epstein and Teraspulsky test whether the subjects are over-, under-, or correctly estimate the empirical correlations between behaviors. (The consistency of this behavior is what the "features" describe.) They found that the approximate correlation between the behaviors correlated strongly with the empirically observed correlations between these behaviors. Subjects are sensitive to even very small correlations, and their belief in associations keeps track of how far they are inappropriate (ie, if they know when they do not know), and higher for the most powerful relationships. The subject also shows awareness of the effects of aggregation on various occasions and uses a sensible strategy to arrive at a decision. Epstein concluded that "Far from being a common adherent, as suggested earlier, [subject] intuition aligns psychometric principles in some important ways when assessing the relationship between real-life behavior."
While described as "robust, steady, and pervasive", the meta-analysis of 173 eligible studies of actor-observer asymmetry available in 2005 was established, surprisingly, the effect size close to zero. This analysis allows a systematic review of where, if at all, the effect applies. This analysis shows that asymmetry is only found when 1. others are described as very unusual, 2. when hypothetical (not real) events are described, 3. when intimate people (know each other well), or 4 when the level of freedom high researchers. It seems that under these circumstances two asymmetries are observed: asymmetric negative events are attributed to the properties of others, but instead held for positive events, favoring self-serving biases rather than actor-observer asymmetries.
Description
Some theories predict fundamental attributional errors, and thus both compete to explain them, and can be forged if they do not occur. Notable examples include:
- Just-world phenomenon. The belief that people get what they deserve and deserves what they get, the first concept being theorized by Melvin J. Lerner (1977). Associating failure with a dispositional cause rather than a situational cause - irreversible and unmanageable - meets our need to believe that the world is just and that we have control over our lives. We are motivated to see a just world because it reduces the threat we feel, gives us a sense of security, helps us find meaning in difficult and troubling circumstances, and benefits us psychologically. Unfortunately, the equitable hypothesis in the world also generates a tendency for people to blame and belittle victims of accidents or tragedies, such as rape and domestic violence, to convince themselves of their incapacity to such events. People can even blame the victim's mistake in "past lives" to pursue justification for their bad results.
- The significance of the actor. We tend to associate the observed effects with potential causes that interest us. When we observe others, the person is the main reference point while the situation is ignored as if it were just a backdrop. Thus, attribution to the behavior of others is more likely to focus on the people we see, rather than situational forces acting on people we may not be aware of. (When we look at ourselves, we are more aware of the forces that work for us Orientation into such outward versus orientations for an observer-bias bias.)
- Lack of complicated adjustments. Sometimes, even though we are aware that the person's behavior is limited by situational factors, we still make a fundamental attribution error. This is because we do not take into account behavior and situational information simultaneously to characterize the disposition of the actor. Initially, we use observed behaviors to characterize people with automaticity. We need to make deliberate and conscious efforts to adjust our inference by considering situational constraints. Therefore, when situational information is not adequately taken into account for adjustments, uncorrected dispositional inferences create fundamental attributional errors. This will also explain why people make fundamental attribution mistakes to a greater extent when they are under cognitive load; ie when they have less motivation or energy to process situational information.
- Culture. There are allegations of cultural differences occurring in attributional error: people from individualistic (Western) cultures are reported to be more vulnerable to mistakes while people from collective culture are less vulnerable. Based on cartoon-figure presentations for Japanese and American subjects, it has been suggested that collectivist subjects may be more influenced by information from the context (eg more affected by the faces around it in assessing facial expressions). Alternatively, individualistic subjects may prefer focus object processing, rather than context. Others suggest that Western individualism is associated with seeing self and others as independent agents, thus focusing on the individual rather than the contextual details.
Versus correspondence bias
Fundamental attribution errors are generally used interchangeably with "bias correspondence" (sometimes called "correspondence inference", although this phrase refers to a judgment that is not always a bias, which arises when the inference is taken incorrectly, eg dispositional inference when the real cause is situational). However, there is a debate about whether the two terms should be distinguished from each other. The three main differences between these two judicial processes have been disputed:
- It seems to be found in different situations, since the conclusion of dispositional dispositions and situational inferences can be obtained spontaneously. Attribution processing, however, seems to occur only when events are unexpected or contrary to previous expectations. This idea is supported by research conducted by Semin and Marsman (1994), who found that various types of verbs invite conclusions and attributions. The conclusion of correspondence is invited to a greater extent by interpretative action verbs (such as "help") than state acts or state verbs, thus indicating that they are produced in different circumstances.
- The conclusion of causal correspondence and attribution also differs in terms of automaticity. Conclusions can occur spontaneously if behavior implies situational or dispositional inference, while causal attribution occurs much more slowly (eg Smith & Miller, 1983).
- It has also been suggested that the conclusions of causal correspondence and attribution are obtained by different mechanisms. It is generally agreed that the conclusion of correspondence is established by going through several stages. First, the person must interpret the behavior, and then, if there is enough information to do so, add the situational information and revise their inference. They can then adjust their inferences by considering dispositional information as well. Causal attribution appears to be formed either by processing visual information using perceptual mechanisms, or by activating knowledge structures (eg schemes) or by systematic data analysis and processing. Therefore, due to differences in theoretical structure, stronger correspondence conclusions are related to behavioral interpretation rather than causal attribution.
Based on earlier differences between causal attribution and correspondence inference, some researchers argue that fundamental attributional errors should be regarded as a tendency to create dispositions rather than situational explanations for behavior, whereas correspondence bias should be considered as a tendency to draw concise correspondence dispositions of behavior. By different definitions between the two, several cross-cultural studies have also found that cultural differences in correspondence bias are not equivalent to fundamental attributional errors. While the latter has been found to be more common in individualistic cultures rather than collective culture, a correspondence bias occurs across cultures, suggesting differences between the two phrases.
Criticism
The existence of the effect has been challenged by the 2006 meta-analysis, whose findings suggest that the effect can only be maintained under limited conditions.
See also
- Attribution (psychology)
- Baseline error
- Cognitive thinkers
- Dispositional attribution
- Explanation style
- Self-service bias
Cognitive bias
References
Further reading
External links
- Detailed explanations by Lee Ross and Richard Nisbett
Source of the article : Wikipedia
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