Senin, 16 Juli 2018

Sponsored Links

What did NASA Change After the Apollo 13 Disaster? - YouTube
src: i.ytimg.com

Apollo 13 is the seventh manned mission in the Apollo space program and the third is meant to land on the Moon. The aircraft was launched on April 11, 1970, at 2:13 pm EST (19:13 UTC) from Kennedy Space Center, Florida, but the lunar landing was canceled after the oxygen tank exploded two days later, disabling the Service Module (SM) where the Command Module (CM) ) has been dependent. Despite major difficulties caused by limited energy, cabin heat loss, drinkable water shortages, and the critical need to make temporary improvements to carbon dioxide removal systems, the crew returned safely to Earth on April 17, 1970, six days after launch.

The flight passes through the Moon which is far at 254 kilometers (137 nautical miles) above the moon's surface, and 400,171 km (248.655 million) from Earth, the outer space record marking the most distant human ever traveled from Earth. This mission was directed by James A. Lovell with John L. "Jack" Swigert as the Command Module Pilot and Fred W. Haise as the Pilot Lunar Module. Swigert was a late replacement for the original CM pilot Ken Mattingly, who was prevented by a flight surgeon after being hit by German measles.

The story of Apollo 13's mission has been dramatized several times, especially in the 1995 film Apollo 13 .


Video Apollo 13



Crew

Main and backup crew

According to a standard crew rotation in place during the Apollo program, the main crew for Apollo 13 will be the reserve crew for Apollo 10 with Mercury and Gemini veteran L. Gordon Cooper as commander. The crew consisted of

  • L. Gordon Cooper, Jr (Commander);
  • Donn F. Eisele (Pilot Module Command);
  • Edgar D. Mitchell (Lunar Module Pilot).

Deke Slayton, Director of NASA Aircraft Operations, never intended to play Cooper and Eisele on other missions, because they were disliked by NASA's management for various reasons (Cooper because of his weak attitude towards training, and Eisele over incidents over Apollo 7 and affairs extra-marriage). He assigned them to the reserve crew only because of the lack of manpower qualified in the Astronaut Office at the time of the assignment needs to be made. Slayton feels Cooper does not have more than a few chances to accept Apollo 13's orders, if he does an extraordinary job with a job he does not do. Despite Eisele's problems with management, Slayton always intends to assign him to the Apollo Application Program mission in the future rather than the moon mission, but the program is finally cut down into only Skylab components.

Thus, the original assignment Slayton handed over to his superiors for this flight was:

  • Alan B. Shepard, Jr. (Commander);
  • Stuart A. Roosa (Pilot Command Module);
  • Edgar D. Mitchell (Pilot Lunar Module).

For the first time, Slayton's recommendation was denied by management, who felt that Shepard needed more time to practice properly for the moon flight, as he recently benefited from experimental surgery to correct inner ear disorders that kept him grounded since his flight The first Mercury in 1961. Thus, the Lovell crew, a reserve for the historic Apollo 11 mission and hence scheduled for Apollo 14, was exchanged for the Shepard crew and the original crew election for the mission became:

The main crew:

You reserve:

Ken Mattingly was originally intended as a Pilot Module Command. Seven days before launch, the Pilot Lunar Backup Module, Charlie Duke, contracted rubella from one of his children. It describes both the main and backup crews, who are coached together. Mattingly was found to be the only one of the other five who had no rubella as a child and thus were not immune. Three days before the launch, at the urging of the Flight Surgeon, Swigert was transferred to the main crew.

Mattingly never contracted rubella and was assigned after the mission as a Pilot Module Command for the Young crew, who then flew Apollo 16, the fifth mission to land on the Moon.

Support crew

  • Vance D. Brand;
  • Jack R. Lousma;
  • Joseph P. Kerwin.

Aviation director

  • Gene Kranz (lead) - The White Team;
  • Glynn Lunney - The Black Team;
  • Milt Windler - Tim Maroon;
  • Gerry Griffin - The Gold Team.

Symbol emblem

The astronaut's emblems are chiseled as medals depicting the Steeds of Apollo by Lumen Martin Winter and beaten by the Franklin Mint.

Maps Apollo 13



Mission parameters

  • Mass: CSM Odyssey <63470 pounds (28,790 kg); LM Aquarius 33,490 pounds (15,190 kg);
  • Perigee: 99.3 nautical miles (183.9 km);
  • Apogee (parking orbit): 100.3 nautical miles (185.8 km);
  • Tilt (Departure of Earth): 31.817Ã, Â °;
  • Period: 88.19 minutes

Destination

The mission of Apollo 13 is to explore the formation of Fra Mauro, or the Fra Mauro plateau, named after the 80 kilometer (50 mile) Fra Mauro crater located within it. It is a vast and hilly selenological area which is considered to consist of ejecta from the impact that forms Mare Imbrium.

Apollo's next mission, Apollo 14, finally managed to fly to Fra Mauro.

Cancel

April 14, 1970 UTC (13 April 21:07:53 CST)

  • Tank oxygen explosion: 03:07:53 UTC (55:54:53 Ground Elapsed Time); 173,790.5 million (321,860 km) from Earth
  • CSM power down, LM is turned on: 05:23 UTC (58:10 Ground Elapsed Time)

The closest approach to the Moon

15 April 1970, 00:21:00 UTC; 137Â nmi (253,7 km)

Splashdown

17th of April 1970, 18:07:41 UTC (142: 54: 47 Time Passes from Land). Crew was on board the USS Iwo Jima 45 minutes later.

Incredible Facts About Apollo 13 That Will Take Your Breath Away
src: pixfeeds.com


Mission highlights

Launch and translunar injection

The mission was launched at the planned time, 2:13:00 PM EST (19:13:00 UTC) on April 11th. An anomaly occurs when the second stage engine, the middle (in the engine) dies about two minutes early. Four outboard engines and third-stage engines burned longer to compensate, and the vehicle reached very close to the planned orbital orbital orbit of 100 nautical miles (190 km), followed by a normal translucent injection about two hours later. The shutdown engine is determined to be caused by severe pogo oscillations measured at 68 g and frequency of 16 hertz, stretching the 3 inches (76 mm) thrust frame. The vehicle guiding system turns off the engine in response to pressure fluctuations in the perceived pressure chamber. Pogo oscillations have been seen on previous Titan rockets, and also on Saturn V during Apollo 6, but on Apollo 13, they were reinforced by unexpected interactions with turbopump cavitation. Then the mission applies the modified anti-pogo modification. These include the addition of a helium-gas reservoir to the center of the liquid oxygen channel machine for moist pressure oscillations, automatic cutoff as reserves, and the simplification of the propellant valves of all five second-stage engines.

The crew maneuvered the separation and transposition to install the Odyssey Command Module to the Lunar Module (LM) Aquarius , and withdrew from the third stage spent, the controller of the ground was then sent on the course to influence the Moon in the seismometer range placed on the surface by Apollo 12. They then settled in for a three day trip to Fra Mauro.

Accident

Nearing 56 hours to the mission, Apollo 13 is about 205,000 miles (330,000 km) from Earth on the way to the Moon. About six and a half minutes after the end of live TV broadcast from the spacecraft, Haise is in the process of closing LM, while Lovell keeps a TV camera. Houston flight controllers are asking Swigert to turn on the fan-stirring hydrogen and oxygen tanks in the Service Module, designed to damage cryogenic content and improve the accuracy of their quantity readings. Two minutes later, the astronauts heard a "big explosion", accompanied by fluctuations in electric power and shootings of attitude control boosters. The crew thought that the meteoroids might have attacked the Lunar Module. Communications and telemetry to Earth disappear for 1.8 seconds, until the system is automatically corrected by switching the high gain S-band antenna, which is used for translunar communication, from narrow beam to widescreen mode.

Immediately after the explosion, Swigert reported a "problem", which Lovell pronounced and clarified as the "ultimate undervolt B bus", temporary loss of operating voltage on both major spacecraft electrical circuits. The oxygen tank 2 immediately reads the zero quantity. About three minutes later, fuel cells number 1 and number 3 failed. Lovell reported looking out the window that the plane was issuing "sort gas" into space. The number of oxygen tank 1 was gradually reduced to zero for the next 130 minutes, completely depleting the oxygen supply BC.

Since the fuel cell generates an electric Commando/Service Module by combining hydrogen and oxygen into the water, when the oxygen tank 1 dries, the remaining fuel cell eventually dies, leaving the plane on battery power and water limited to the Command Module. The crew was forced to close the CM completely to save this to reenter, and to turn on LM to be used as a "lifeboat". This situation has been suggested during previous training simulations, but has not been considered a possible scenario. Without LM, the accident must have been fatal.

Crew life and return trip

Damage to the Service Module makes safe returns from lunar landings impossible, so Flight Director Gene Kranz orders the cancellation of missions. The existing abortion plan, first established in 1966, was evaluated; the fastest is the Direct Abort path, which is required using the Service Module Propulsion System (SPS) engine to achieve delta- v <6.07-feet-per-second (1.853 m/s). p.Ã, III-14 Although successful SPS shooting at 60 hours of elapsed time (GET) will land a crew one day in advance (at 118 GET hours, or 58 hours later), large delta- v is only possible if LM is removed first, p.Ã, II-1 and because the survival of the crew depends on the existence of LM as long as the coast returns to Earth, the choice is "out question." p.Ã, III-17 An alternative would burn SPS fuel for thinning, then discard the Service Module and create a second burn with the Machine Descent Propulsion LM (DPS) system. It is desirable to keep the Attached Service Module as long as possible because of the heat protection it provides the heat shield of the Command Module. Apollo 13 almost enters the sphere of gravity influence of the moon (at 61 hours GET), which is the breakeven point between direct and circumlunar abortion, and the latter allows more time for evaluation and planning before a large rocket is burned. > p. B-5 There is also concern about "structural integrity of the Service Module," p.Ã, III-23 so mission planners are instructed that the SPS engine will not be used "except as a last resort." p.Ã, III-14

For these reasons, Kranz opted for the alternate circumnar option, using the Moon's gravity to return the ship to Earth. Apollo 13 had abandoned the initial free back pass at the start of the mission, as required for the lunar landing at Fra Mauro. Therefore, the first order of business is to rebuild the free return path with 30.7 seconds of DPS combustion. The derived machine is used again two hours after periinteksi, the closest approach to the Moon ("PC 2 burn"), to speed up the 10 hour Earth's return and move the landing site from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. More aggressive burns can be performed on PC 2 by removing the Service Module first, returning the crew in the same amount of time as a direct abortion, p.Ã, III-20 but this is considered unnecessary given the level of usage consumables. Burns 4 minutes, 24 seconds is so accurate that only two smaller corrections are then required.

Adequate ingenuity under extreme pressure is required of the crew, flight controllers, and support personnel for safe returns. Expanded drama is shown on television. Because electricity is very limited, no live TV broadcasts are created; TV commentators use models and animated footage as illustrations. Low power levels make voice communication difficult.

The Lunar Module runs out to keep two people for a day and a half instead of three for four days. Oxygen is the least important consumables since LM is sufficient to suppress LM after every EVA surface. Unlike the Command/Service Module (CSM), which is powered by a fuel cell that produces water as a byproduct, the LM is powered by a zinc-silver battery, so electrical and water power (used for cooling and drinking equipment) is essential. consumables. To keep LM's life support and communications systems operable until reentry, the LM is switched off to the lowest level. In particular, the LM Abort Guidance System is used for most of the beaches back to Earth rather than the main guide system, as it uses less power and water. pp.Ã, III-17,33,40

The availability of lithium hydroxide (LiOH) to remove carbon dioxide poses a serious problem. The internal supply of LM LiOH tubes is not sufficient to support the crew until it returns, and the remainder is stored in the hereditary stage, out of reach. CM has an adequate supply of tubes, but this does not correspond to the LM. Engineers on the ground improvised by joining a cube-shaped CM tube to an LM cylinder cylinder by pulling air through them with the appropriate back hose. NASA engineers call the improvisation device a "mailbox".

Another problem to be solved for safe returns is to achieve full power from the beginning of a completely dead Command Module, something never intended to be done in flight. The flight controller John Aaron, with the support of Mattingly planted astronauts and many engineers and designers, has to create new procedures to do this with limited power and timing factors. This is further complicated by the fact that reduced power levels in LM cause the internal temperature to drop to as low as 4 ° C (39 ° F). The unfired CM becomes so cold that water begins to condense on the solid surface, causing concern that this may abbreviate the electrical system when reactivated. This turned out not to be a problem, in part due to the widespread electrical insulation repair after the Apollo 1 fire.

The final problem to solve is how to separate the Lunar Module with a safe distance from the Command Module just before reentering. The normal procedure is to use the Service Module's reaction control (RCS) control system to pull CSM after removing the LM along with the Command Module docking ring, but this RCS does not work due to power failure, and a useless SM will be released. before LM. To solve the problem, Grumman requested engineering expertise from the University of Toronto. A team of six UT engineers, led by senior scientist Bernard Etkin, was formed to solve the problem in one day. The team concluded that pressing a tunnel connecting the Lunar Module to the Command Module just before the separation would provide the power needed to push the two modules a safe distance from each other just before reentering. The team has 6 hours to calculate the required pressure, using slide rules. They need accurate calculations, because too much pressure can damage the hold and seal, causing the astronauts to burn; too low a pressure will not provide sufficient separation distance from LM. Grumman delivered their calculations to NASA, and from there in turns to astronauts, who managed to use them.

Re-entry and splashdown

When Apollo 13 approached the Earth, the first crew dumped the Service Module, using LM's reaction control system to withdraw from a safe distance from it, not a normal procedure that uses RCS SM automatic shooting. They photographed it and then analyzed the cause of the accident. That's when the crew was surprised to see for the first time that the entire Sector 4 panel had exploded. According to analysts, these photos also show antenna damage and may tilt up to the fuel cell rack above the oxygen tank compartment.

Finally, the crew dumped the Lunar Module Aquarius using the above procedure to work at the University of Toronto, leaving the Odyssey Command Module to restart its entry through the atmosphere. The re-entry on the moon mission is usually accompanied by about four minutes of typical communication disturbances caused by air ionization around the Command Module. The power outage at Apollo 13 reentered six minutes, which was 87 seconds longer than expected. Possibility of heat shield damage from O
2
tank breaks increase tension periods of power outages.

Odyssey regains radio contact and splashes safely in the South Pacific Ocean, 21Ã, Â ° 38? 24? S 165Ã, Â ° 21? 42? W , southeast of American Samoa and 6.5 km (3.5Ã, nmi) from the recovery ship, USS Iwo Jima . The crew is in good condition except Haise, who is suffering from a serious urinary tract infection due to insufficient water intake. To avoid altering the trajectory of the spacecraft, the crew has been instructed to temporarily stop the urine exhaust. Misunderstanding prompted the crew to keep all urine for the rest of the flight.

Modul Lunar dan Modul Layanan masuk kembali ke atmosfer Pasifik Selatan antara pulau Fiji dan Selandia Baru.


US LOS ANGELES Apollo 13 Universal Studios PHOTO GERRIT DE HEUS ...
src: c8.alamy.com


Analisis dan respons

NASA administrator Thomas Paine and Deputy Administrator George Low sent a memorandum to NASA's Director of Langley Research Center Edgar M. Cortright on April 17, 1970, (spacecraft splashdown date) advising him of his appointment as chair of the Apollo 13 Review Board to investigate the cause of the accident.

Review board

A second note to Cortright of Paine and Low on April 21 establishes the council as follows:

Members:
  • Robert F. Allnutt (Assistant Administrator, NASA Hqs.);
  • Neil Armstrong (Astronaut, Center for Manned Spacecraft);
  • Dr. John F. Clark (Director, Goddard Space Flight Center);
  • Brig. General Walter R. Hedrick, Jr. (Director of Space, DCS/RED, Hqs., USAF);
  • Vincent L. Johnson (Deputy Associate Administrator-Engineering, Office of Space Science and Applications);
  • Milton Klein (Manager, NASA-NASA Nuclear Space);
  • Dr. Hans M. Mark (Director, Ames Research Center).
Counselor:
  • George Malley (Chief Counselor, Langley Research Center)
OMSF Technical Support:
  • Charles W. Mathews (Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of Manned Space Flight)
Observer:
  • William A. Anders (Executive Secretary, National Aeronautics and Space Board, ex-astronaut);
  • Dr. Charles D. Harrington (Chairman, NASA Aerospace Security Advisory Panel);
  • I. I. Pinkel (Director, Institute for Aerospace Research and Safety Data, Lewis Research Center).
Congress Liaison:
  • Gerald J. Mossinghoff (Office of Legislative Affairs, NASA Hqs.)
Public Relations:
  • Brian Duff (Public Affairs Officer, Manned Space Center)

Activities and reports

The Council deeply investigates and analyzes the history of oxygen tank manufacture and testing, and its installation and testing on spacecraft to the launch of Apollo 13, as documented in detailed notes and records. They visited and consulted with engineers at the contractor site and Kennedy Space Center. After the theoretical theory was developed, the elements were tested, including simulated test simulations in a vacuum chamber, with a damaged tank installed in the fuel cell chamber. This test confirms the theory when a similar explosion was created, which blew out the outside panel exactly as it did in flight. Cortright sent the Apollo Report Board Report to Thomas Paine on June 15, 1970.

Failure begins on the number 2 oxygen tank of the Service. The damaged Teflon isolation on the cable to the stirring fan inside the oxygen tank 2 allows the cable to shorten and ignite this insulation. The rapidly generated flame increases pressure beyond the 1,000-pound-per-square-inch (6,9 MPa) limit and the tank dome fails, filling the cell's fuel cell (Sector 4) with oxygen and gas-burning products rapidly expanding. It is also possible that some combustion occurs from the Mylar/Kapton thermal insulation material used to coat the oxygen shelf compartment at this bay.

The resulting pressure inside the compartment bursts a bolt attached to the 12-foot (4.0 m) exterior aluminum outer skin panel, which at that time exploded might cause minor damage to nearby S-band antennas.

The mechanical shift forces the oxygen valve to close in fuel cells number 1 and number 3, so it only operates about three minutes in the oxygen in the feed path. The shock also either partially injures the line from the number 1 oxygen tank, or causes a leak-release check or valve, causing its contents to leak into space for the next 130 minutes, completely depleting the oxygen supply of BC.

The Council determines that the failure of the oxygen tank is caused by an unlikely chain of events. Tanks containing cryogens, such as liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen, require ventilation, excellent insulation, or both, to avoid excessive buildup of pressure due to evaporation of the contents of the tank. The oxygen tank Service Module is so isolated that they can safely contain hydrogen and supercritical hydrogen for years. Each oxygen tank holds several hundred pounds of oxygen, which is used to breathe air and produce electricity and water. Construction of the tank makes internal checking impossible.

Tank contains several components relevant to the accident:

  • quantity sensor;
  • fan to stir the contents of the tank for more accurate quantity measurement;
  • heaters to evaporate liquid oxygen as needed;
  • thermostat to protect the heater;
  • temperature sensor;
  • fill and drain valves and piping.

The heater and thermostat protector was originally designed for the 28-volt DC Command Module bus. The specifications for heating and thermostat were then changed to allow a 65-volt ground supply, to press the tank faster. Beechcraft, the tank subcontractor, does not upgrade the thermostat to handle higher voltages.

The oxygen rack that carries the oxygen tank was initially installed in the Apollo 10 Service Module, but was removed to correct potential electromagnetic interference problems. During the lifting, the rack accidentally fell about 2 inches (5 cm) because the retaining bolt has not been released. The tank did not seem to be damaged, but the loose filler tub was damaged, and photographs suggested that the lid cap at the top of the tank might have hit the fuel cell rack. The review board report 13 Apollo considers the possibility of tank damage during this incident being "rather low." After the tank is filled for soil testing, it can not be emptied through normal sewer. To avoid delaying the mission by replacing the tank, the heater is connected to a 65-volt ground power to boil oxygen. Lovell signed this procedure. It should take several days at thermostatic opening temperatures of 27 ° C (81 ° F). When the thermostat is opened, the 65 volt supply fuses the contacts closed and the heater remains powered. The board is confirmed by testing that the thermostat is welded closed itself under a higher voltage. This raises the heating temperature to around 540 ° C (1,000 ° F). A graphic recorder on the heater current indicates that the heater does not rotate and die, as it should if the thermostat is working correctly, but no one notices it at the time. Since the temperature sensor is not designed to read higher than the thermostat opening temperature of 27 ° C (81 ° F), the monitoring equipment does not register the actual temperature in the tank. The gas boils within hours of the day.

Continuous high temperatures melt the Teflon insulation on the fan power supply cable and leave it open. When the tank is refilled with oxygen, it becomes a bomb waiting to be turned off. During the "cryo stir" procedure, fan power passes through the seemingly shorted shorts of wires, producing sparks and triggers Teflon. This in turn will boil liquid oxygen faster than the tank vents that can remove it.

In June 1970, the Cortright Report provided an in-depth analysis of the mission in a very detailed five-chapter report with eight attachments. This includes copies of NASA procedures established to reduce high pressure in cryogenic oxygen tanks, to include:

  • Turns on four heating tanks and a dead fan;
  • Pull both the heater circuit breakers to open to remove the energy source;
  • Perform 2 minute cleansing, or directly open valve O 2 .

This procedure is designed to prevent hardware failure so that lunar landing missions can proceed. The Apollo 13 Mission Operations Report tells how the warning alarm and master warning has been turned off for the previous low pressure readings on the hydrogen tank 2, and so it does not trigger to draw attention to the high oxygen. read the pressure.

The oxygen tank 2 is not the only pressure vessel that failed during this mission. Prior to the accident, the crew had moved the scheduled entry to the advanced Lunar Module with three hours. This was done to gain an earlier view on the reading of supercritical helium tank pressure (SHe) at the LM decrease stage, which has been suspected since before the launch. After the decision to cancel, helium pressure continues to increase and Mission Control predicts the time that the explosive disc will break. Disk burst helium tank broke at 108: 54, after flyby month. The expulsion reverses the direction of the passive thermal control roll (PTC) (dubbed "roll barbecue").

While the board of investigators â € <â € Corrective action

The oxygen tank is redesigned, with the thermostat upgraded to handle the right tension. The heater is maintained because they need to keep the oxygen pressure. Stirring fans, with unsealed motors, are ejected, which means the oxygen quantity gauge is no longer accurate. This requires the addition of a third tank so there is no tank that will be under half full.

All power cables in the bay are stainless steel sheathed power systems, and the oxygen quantity probes are converted from aluminum to stainless steels. The fuel cell oxygen supply valve is redesigned to isolate the Teflon-coated cable from oxygen. The Space monitoring and Mission Control system has been modified to provide faster and noticeable anomaly alerts.

How Quickly Did the Crew of Apollo 13 Know They'd Lost the Moon ...
src: i.ytimg.com


Mission notes

Since Apollo 13 follows its free return path, its height above the lunar side is approximately 100 km (60 mi) greater than the orbital height of Apollo's remaining moon missions. The moon is almost at the top during missions (as well as during Apollo 10 and Apollo 15 flights), which also increases the distance from Earth. The combination of these two effects ensures that Apollo 13 holds the record of absolute altitude for a manned spacecraft, reaching a distance of 400,171 kilometers (248,655 million) from Earth at 7:21 pm EST, April 14, 1970.

A7L space suits intended for use on the lunar surface by Lovell were the first to feature red ribbons on arms, legs, EVA moon helmet assemblies, and life support backpacks. This is because Mission Control personnel who watch video feeds from Apollos 11 and 12 have trouble distinguishing astronauts while both have sunshades down. The red ribbon is used for the remaining Apollo flights, the Space Shuttle program, and on the International Space Station.

The mission of Apollo 13 was called "successful failure" by Lovell, due to the successful return of successful astronauts, but the failed lunar landing. This is also called "the best hour of NASA."

President Nixon awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom to the crew and Apollo 13 Mission Operations Team for their actions during the mission.

The Cold Cathode Gauge Experiment (CCGE) which is part of ALSEP on Apollo 13 is never flown again. This is a version of the Cold Gauge Ion Gauge (CCIG) shown on Apollo 12, Apollo 14, and Apollo 15. CCGE is designed as a standalone version of CCIG. On another mission, CCIG is connected as part of the Ion Suprathermal Detector (SIDE). Due to a canceled landing, this experiment was never deployed. Other experiments included in ALSEP Apollo 13 include the Heat Flow Experiment (HFE), Passive Seismic Experiment (PSE), and Lunar Space Lunar Trial Experiment (CPLEE).

Placards and symbols

The original moon plaque is affixed at the front of the Aquarius's ground landing step under the name Mattingly, so a replacement placard with the name Swigert is taken in the cabin, for Lovell to be placed on top of another after he descends the stairs. He keeps the plaque as a souvenir. In his book Lost Moon (later renamed Apollo 13 ), Lovell stated that, apart from the plaque and some other pieces, the only other reminder he had was a letter from Charles Lindbergh.

The Apollo 13 crew patch features three flying horses as the "train" of Apollo in space. Given the Lovell Navy's background, the logo also includes the motto " Ex Luna, scientia ", "borrowed from the motto of the US Navy," Ex scientia tridens "(" From the knowledge, the power of the sea "). The mission number appears in Roman numerals as Apollo XIII. The patch does not have to be modified after Mattingly's replacement because it is one of only two Apollo mission symbols - the other being Apollo 11 - excluding crew names. It was designed by artist Lumen Martin Winter, who based it on the mural he did for The St. Regis Hotel, New York City. The mural was later purchased by actor Tom Hanks, who plays Lovell in the Apollo 13 movie, and is now on the wall of a restaurant near Chicago owned by Lovell's son.

Successful experiments

Although Apollo 13 failed to land on the Moon, some experiments were done successfully because they started before or were done independently of the explosion of the oxygen tank.

  • Some experiments to study electrical phenomena were made before and during the Apollo 13 launch. This information is used to better understand the dangers of launch in less than ideal weather conditions.
  • Eleven photographs of the Earth were taken at the right time recorded, to study the feasibility of using geosynchronous satellites to study cloud altitudes.
  • The third stage of S-IVB Apollo 13 is the first intentionally crashing into the lunar surface, as a seismic active experiment that measures its impact with the seismometer remaining on the lunar surface by Apollo 12 crew. (S-IVB from four previous lunar missions were sent into solar orbit with ground control after use.)

"Withdrawing fees"

As a joke after the success of Apollo 13, the Grumman Aerospace Corporation pilot, Sam Greenberg (who helped with the strategy of re-routing the power of the LM to the paralyzed CM) issued a tongue-in-cheek invoice of $ 400,540.05 to Rockwell North America, Pratt and Whitney, and Beech Aircraft, prime and subcontractor to CSM, for "crashing" the paralyzed ship most of the way to the Moon and back. The figure is based on an estimated 400,001 miles (643,739 km) at $ 1.00 per mile, plus $ 4.00 for the first mile. An additional $ 536.05 included for charging the battery, oxygen, and "extra guest in the room" (Swigert). 20% discount "commercial discount," as well as a 2% discount again if North America has to pay in cash, reducing the total to $ 312,421.24. North American payments declined, noting that it had transported three previous LM Grummans to the Moon (Apollo 10, Apollo 11 and Apollo 12) without such reciprocal fees.

Apollo 13 - Simple English Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
src: upload.wikimedia.org


The location of the spacecraft

The previous Command shell module was in MusÃÆ'Â © e de l'Air et de l'Espace, in Paris. Interior components have been removed during accident investigation and reassembled into Boilerplate BP-1102A, out-water training module; and then on display at the Museum of Natural History and Science in Louisville, Kentucky, until 2000. The command modules and internal components are reassembled, and Odyssey is currently on display at the Cosmosphere in Hutchinson, Kansas.

The Lunar module burned in Earth's atmosphere on April 17, 1970, which has been targeted to enter the Pacific Ocean to reduce the likelihood of contamination from the SNAP 27 thermoelectric power plant (RTG) on board. Aimed to empower ALSEP mission, RTG safely reentered (as it was designed) and landed on the Tonga Trench. Although it will remain radioactive for several thousand years, it seems that it will not release any 3.9 kg of radioactive plutonium-238.

Lovell's lunar space suit helmet, one of his gloves, and a plaque meant to be left on the Moon was exhibited at the Adler Planetarium in Chicago, Illinois.

Apollo 13 S-IVB with its Instrument Unit guided to crash into the lunar surface on April 14, signaling for the Apollo 12 Passive Seismic Experiment.


Damage From Apollo 13 Movie
src: cdn.natgeotv.com.au


Popular culture and media

The 1974 film Houston, We Got a Problem, when setting up the Apollo 13 incident, was a fictional drama about the crises faced by ground personnel when an emergency disrupted their work schedule and placed additional stress on their lives; only some news clips and a narrator voice deal are serious with the real problem. "Houston... We Got Got Problem" is also the episode title of the BBC A Life At Stake documentary series, broadcast in March 1978. It is an accurate, if simplified, reconstruction. the event.

Lovell was approached in 1991 by journalist Jeffrey Kluger about collaborating on a mission non-fiction account. The resulting book, Lost Moon: The Perilous Voyage of Apollo 13 , was published in 1994.

The following year, in 1995, the film adaptation of the book, Apollo 13 , was released, directed by Ron Howard and starring Tom Hanks as Lovell, Bill Paxton as Haise, Kevin Bacon as Swigert, Gary Sinise as Mattingly , Ed Harris as flight director Gene Kranz, and Kathleen Quinlan as Marilyn Lovell. James Lovell, Eugene Kranz, and other principals have stated that the film portrays mission events with reasonable accuracy, given that some dramatic licenses have been taken. For example, the film alters the strained Lovell's famous follow-up to Swigert's original words from, "Houston, we have a problem", until "Houston, we have problems". The film was nominated for several Academy Awards, including Best Picture, Best Supporting Actor (Harris) and Best Supporting Actress (Quinlan).

In the 1998 miniseries From Earth to the Moon , produced jointly by Hanks and Howard, this mission was dramatized in the episode "We Interrupt This Program". Instead of showing the incident from a crew perspective as in the feature film Apollo 13 , it was instead presented from an Earth-bound perspective from a television reporter competing for the coverage of the show.

In 2008, an interactive theatrical performance titled Apollo 13: Mission Control aired at BATS Theater in Wellington, New Zealand. Production faithfully re-creates the mission control console and the audience becomes part of the storyline. The show also featured the 'guest' astronauts every night: a suitable member of the community and among other tasks, stirred the oxygen tank and said the line "Houston, we have a problem." This 'replacement' astronaut nodded to Jack Swigert, who succeeded Ken Mattingly shortly before the launch in 1970. The production toured extensively in New Zealand and Australia in 2010-2011. Production is scheduled to travel to the US in 2012.

In Moonshot's episode of DC's Legends of Tomorrow episode of 'Moonshot', an explosion of oxygen tank was avoided when Eobard Thawne disguised herself as Swigert, to retrieve a piece of Spear of Destiny hidden in the flagpole of the Flag of America planted on July 21, 1969. Thawne and Ray Palmer crashed land landing on the Moon's surface.

In November 2011, a notebook containing Lovell's checklists used to calculate the trajectory to get a damaged spacecraft, Apollo 13, back to Earth, and Handell's handwritten calculations, was auctioned by Heritage Auctions for $ 388,375. NASA made an inquiry via email asking for Inheritance if Lovell had a clear title for the notebook, stating that NASA "showed nothing" that the agency had transferred ownership of the checklist to Lovell. In January 2012, Heritage stated that sales had been postponed after NASA launched an investigation into whether it belonged to astronauts for sale.

Apollo 13 - National Geographic
src: natgeo.imgix.net


See also

  • Houston, we have a problem
  • List of artificial objects on the Moon

Historic Apollo 13 Flight Manual for Sale | Mechtraveller
src: mechtraveller.com


References

This article incorporates public domain material from websites or documents from the National Aeronautics and Space Agency.

BBC - Future - The unsung heroes who prevented the Apollo 13 disaster
src: ichef.bbci.co.uk


Further reading

  • Lattimer, Dick (1985). What We Do Is Fly to the Moon . Life-history series. 1 . Preface by James A. Michener (1st ed.). Alachua, FL: Whispering Eagle Press. ISBN: 0-9611228-0-3. LCCNÃ, 85222271.

Spaceflight mission report: Apollo 13
src: www.spacefacts.de


External links

  • "Apollo 13" in Encyclopedia Astronautica
  • "Apollo-13 (29") at NASA, mission summary
  • Cass, Stephen (April 1, 2005). "Apollo 13, We Have a Solution". IEEE spectrum . New York: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers: Part 1 of 3 . Retrieved July 5, 2013 .
  • Atkinson, Nancy (April 8, 2010). "13 Things That Keep Apollo 13". Universe Today . Retrieved April 25 2012 . Ã,

NASA Report

  • Apollo 13 Press Kit (PDF), NASA, Release No. 70-50K, April 2, 1970
  • Apollo Space Airplane - Chronology NASA SP-4009, vol. IV, pt. 3
  • "Table 2-41 Characteristics of Apollo 13" from NASA's History Data Book: Volume III: Programs and Projects 1969-1978 by Linda Neuman Ezell, NASA History Series, NASA SP-4012, ( 1988)
  • "Apollo Program Summary Report" (PDF), NASA, JSC-09423, April 1975
  • "Apollo 13: Moon exploration experiment and photographic summary" (Original planned mission) (PDF) NASA, February 1970
  • Investigation of the Apollo 13 Space Aircraft (PDF) NASA, June 1970
  • Apollo Review Council Report 13 , (PDF) NASA, June 1970
  • "Apollo 13 Technical Air-to-Ground Voice Transcription" (PDF) NASA, April 1970

Rich Media

  • "Space Educators' Handbook Apollo 13" on NASA
  • "Gene Kranz Oral History Interview, Part 2" in C-SPAN; interview conducted April 28, 1999
  • The short film Apollo 13 "Houston, We Got a Problem" is available for free download on the Internet Archive
  • "Apollo 13: Live With Lovell Family During the 'NASA Festive Clock'" - slideshow by Life magazine
  • "Apollo 13: NASA's Best Hour" - spun by Life's magazine on the Internet Archive
  • "Apollo 13: Triumph on the Dark Side" is an episode of Man, Moment, Machine , a 2006 documentary series that airs on The History Channel
  • Apollo 13: Failure of No Choice a documentary on YouTube
  • "Apollo 13 transcripts on Spacelog"
  • "Apollo 13 - 'Houston, we have a problem'" Audio Apollo 13 missions at the first moments of trouble
  • Full post-flight press conference, April 21, 1970: Part 1 - Part 2

Source of the article : Wikipedia

Comments
0 Comments