The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB ) was organized by NASA to investigate the destruction of Columbia's Shuttle Space during STS-107 on atmospheric re-entry on February 1, 2003. The panel determined that the accident was caused by foam insulation being broken from an external fuel tank, forming debris destroying the orbiting wing; and that the problem of "shedding debris" is notorious but is considered "accepted" by management. The Panel also recommends changes to be made to improve the safety of future shuttle flights. CAIB released its final report on August 26, 2003.
Video Columbia Accident Investigation Board
Primary findings
The council discovered the immediate physical cause of the accident and also the so-called organizational causes.
The immediate cause of the accident
82 seconds after the launch of a large piece of foam insulation material, the "left bipod beep path", apart from the external tank and hit the left wing front of the space shuttle, damaged the protective carbon heat protector panel.
During reentry into Earth's atmosphere, this damage allows super-hot gases to enter and erode the inner wing structures that lead to the destruction of Columbia . That is the known seventh example of a piece of foam, from this special area of ​​the external tank, free during launch.
Cause of accident organization
The problem of debris dislodged from the external tank is well known and has caused damage to the shuttle on every previous shuttle flight. Damage is usually, but not always, small. Over time, management gets confidence that it is an acceptable risk. NASA decided that it did not guarantee the existence of an extra EVA for visual inspection, feeling that it would be like a car driving on the highway and crashing into Styrofoam coolers.
Maps Columbia Accident Investigation Board
Board recommendations
The Board made 29 specific recommendations for NASA to improve the safety of future space shuttle flights. These recommendations include:
- The foam from the external tank should not free
- Better pre-flight inspection routine
- Improve the image quality available from the shuttle during the ascent and on flight
- Re-certify all shuttle components in 2010
- Establish an independent Technical Engineering Authority responsible for technical requirements and all waivers to them, and will establish a disciplined and systematic approach to identifying, analyzing, and controlling hazards throughout the Shuttle System's lifecycle.
Only two Space Shuttle missions are further allowed to be flown prior to the implementation of this recommendation.
Shuttle program after CAIB report
After the CAIB report came out, NASA implemented all the recommended changes and flew its first post- Columbia mission in 2005. As part of CAIB's recommendation, Shuttle carried a 50-foot inspection inspection attached to the arm robot, which used in 24 hours of launch to check the damage orbiter. Since all but one of the post- Columbia missions are concentrated in the International Space Station, primarily to provide a "safe place" if the orbiter is damaged beyond the normal repair method, NASA implements STS. -3xx emergency mission program that can launch rescue orbits in a short time, similar to the Skylab Rescue planned during the Skylab program.
NASA retired the Space Shuttle fleet on July 21, 2011 after completing the ISS and the last flight and the subsequent landing Atlantis . The space shuttle's replacement, Orion, is made up of Apollo-derived spacecraft launched on Ares I rockets, which will use the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster as the first stage. Orion will not face the danger of O-ring failure (due to the presence of the launch escape system) or shedding foam (since the spacecraft will be launched in the stack configuration). In addition to transporting the crew to the ISS, the Orion spacecraft is (as part of Project Constellation) allowing NASA to return to the Moon. President Obama signed the NASA Authorization Act 2010 on October 11 that officially brings the Constellation program to an end, replacing it with the Space Launch System (SLS) and the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) program to develop launch vehicles and spacecraft to enable exploration missions human beings outside Earth's low orbit.
Board members
Chairman of the Board
- Admiral Hal Gehman, USN
Board member
- Rear Admiral Stephen Turcotte, Commander, Naval Safety Center
- Maj. General John Barry, Director, Plans and Programs, Headquarters of the Armed Forces Command
- Maj. General Kenneth W. Hess, Commander, Air Force Security Center
- Dr. James N. Hallock, Head, Flight Safety Division, US Department of Transportation, Volpe Center
- Sir. Steven B. Wallace, Director of Accident Investigation, Federal Aviation Administration
- Brig. General Agreement Duane, Commander, Space Wing 21, United States Air Force
- Sir. Scott Hubbard, Director, NASA Ames Research Center
- Sir. Roger E. Tetrault, Retired Chairman, McDermott International
- Dr. Sheila E. Widnall, Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Systems Engineering, MIT
- Dr. Douglas D. Osheroff, Professor of Physics and Applied Physics, Stanford University
- Dr. Sally Ride, Former Astronaut and Professor of Space Science, University of California, San Diego.
- Dr. John Logsdon, Director of the Institute for Space Policy, George Washington University
Board support
- Ex Officio Members: Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Bloomfield, NASA Astronaut
- Executive Secretary: Mr. Theron M. Bradley, Jr., NASA Chief Technician
List of additional investigators and support staff CAIB
See also
- Apollo 204 Review Board
- Rogers Commission
References
Source
- CAIB panel and staff information Retrieved 15 February 2004
- CAIB Final Report, Volume 1 (August 26, 2003)
- The STS-107 Investigation Reference page
- NASA SLS MPCV Retrieved 30 April 2011
External links
- Columbia Site of the Accident Investigation Agency
- CAIB hearing transcripts
- the NASA homepage
- Working by the Columbia Accident Investigation Agency at LibriVox (public domain audiobook)
Source of the article : Wikipedia
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