SS El Faro is a roll-on/roll-off combined cargo and United States lift-on/lift-off headquartered by US merchant sailors. Built in 1975 by Sun Shipbuilding & amp; Drydock Co. as Puerto Rico , the ship changed its name to Northern Lights in 1991, and finally, El Faro in 2006. He was lost in the sea with all his arms on October 1, 2015, after losing his propulsion near Hurricane Joaquin's blinds.
El Faro departs from Jacksonville, Florida, to Puerto Rico at 08.10 EST on September 29, 2015, when Joaquin's tropical storm is several hundred miles to the east. Two days later, after Joaquin became a Category 3 hurricane, the ship was likely to have waves of between 20 and 40 feet (6 to 12 m) and winds of more than 80 kn (150 km/h, 92 mph) as it sailed near the eye of the storm.. At around 7:30 am on October 1, the ship had taken water and listed 15 degrees. The final report of the captain, however, indicates that the crew has contained a flood. Shortly thereafter, El Faro stopped all communications with the beach.
On October 2, the 40-year-old vessel was declared missing, and an extensive search operation was launched by the Coast Guard of the United States, with help from the Air Force, the National Air Guard and the Navy. They found broken debris and lifeboats, and saw (but could not recover) an unidentifiable body. El Faro was declared submerged on October 5th. The search was halted at sunset on October 7, where more than 183,000 sqÃ, nmi (630,000 km 2 ; 242,000 Ã, sqÃ, mi) was borne by aircraft and ships. The Navy sent USNS Apache to perform an underwater search for El Faro on October 19, 2015. Apache identifies vessels on October 31 "consistent with ship cargo El Faro ]... in an upright and intact position. "The next day, Nov. 1, the Navy announced a submarine had returned a picture identifying the accident as El Faro .
Video SS El Faro
Previous builds and career
El Faro was built by Sun Shipbuilding and Drydock Corporation in Chester, Pennsylvania, in 1975 as Puerto Rico . As operated by the Navieras de Puerto Rico Steamboat Company, Puerto Rico transports cargo to and from the East Coast of the USA for 15 years. In 1991, it was purchased by Saltchuk Resources, the parent company of TOTE Maritime, and renamed Northern Lights . Two years later, it was extended by 90 feet (27 m) at Alabama Shipyard, Inc. Under Saltchuk, it often sails between Tacoma, Washington, and Anchorage, Alaska.
In February 2003, just before the US-led invasion of Iraq, the ship was hired by the US Military Security Command as part of the Iraqi Liberation Operation; ship carrying Marines and supplies from San Diego, California, to Kuwait. On March 19, while in the Persian Gulf, the ship was shot from a missile. The explosion shook the ship, but did not cause any damage or injury. As of October 2005, near the end of the
When submerged on October 1, 2015, the Merchant El Faro is scheduled to return to Tacoma to free another ship.
Maps SS El Faro
Sinking
The final cruise
On September 29, 2015, at 8:10 pm, El Faro left Jacksonville, Florida for San Juan, Puerto Rico, carrying 391 container shipping, about 294 trailers and cars, and a crew of 33 people - 28 Americans and 5 Poles. The captain of the ship, Captain Michael Davidson, mapped the path which, according to TOTE Maritime, took the ship a safe distance from the storm. At the time of departure, Hurricane Joaquin was still a tropical storm, but meteorologists at the National Hurricane Center predicted that it would likely be a typhoon on the morning of October 1, on the southwestern route to the Bahamas. The course of mapping the ship takes it in 175Ã, nmi (320Ã, km, 200Ã, mi) of the storm, where the sea over 10Ã, ft (3 m) is possible. TOTE can veto the captain's sailing plan to a predicted storm region, but opts not to and chooses the ship to continue. The company said there was no incentive for Davidson to maintain the ship's schedule, but the schedule also appeared to be safe. At least one of the deck officers, the second couple Danielle Randolph, voiced concern before sailing and writing an email to friends and family, "There was a storm here and we headed straight there."
The ship has "passed the annual Coast Guard check in March and other surveys in June", and also successfully completed American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) classes and a legal survey in February 2015. NTSB confirmed on October 20, 2015, that El Faro has successfully completed the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) class and legal survey on February 13, 2015. They also found that safety exercises were conducted weekly and that the ships met the criteria of stability when leaving Jacksonville.
The former crew member of El Faro expressed surprise and shocked that the ship was sailing with a massive storm on its way. They said the ship was a "rust bucket" that "[should] be in the water." They also said that El Faro suffered from drainage problems and the leak was common in the Galley (Kitchen) Compartment. They said the ship was covered with rust and the deck was full of holes recently in August.
Hurricane Joaquin
Throughout September 30 to the morning of October 1, Joaquin continues to trace the southwest. 10 hours after leaving, El Faro is steaming at full speed and deviates from its mapped path. According to Klaus Luhta of the International Organization of Masters, Mates & amp; Pilot, Davidson keeps heading straight to the storm. Joaquin became a hurricane at 8:00 am on September 30, then quickly intensified. At 11:00, the storm has reached Category 3 intensity with maximum sustained wind of 100 kn (185 km/h; 115 mph). Around 7:30 am on October 1, less than 30 hours after the boat sailed from Jacksonville, the Coast Guard of the United States received a satellite notice that the ship had lost its thrust, taken on water - despite the flood contained at the time. message - and has a list of 15 degrees.
The Coast Guard also received one ping from the Beacon Radio Signal Emergency Display. Further efforts by Coast Guard to open communication with El Faro did not work.
The last position reported Marine traffic El Faro is 24.2747 Â ° N 74.94522 Â ° W / 24.2747; -74.94522 ( El Faro's position at 04:01 on October 1 ) at 4: 01 am, heading south-southeast at a speed of 19 km (35 km/h; 22 mph). According to the database of different marine positions, submitted by Reuters, the last repeated positions of El Faro are 23,52 Â ° N 74,02 Â ° W / 23,52; -74.02 ( El Faro's position at 7:56 am on October 1 ) at 7:56, about 35Ã, nmi (65Ã, km; 40Ã, mi) northeast of Crooked Island. This places the ship inside the Hurricane Joaquin eye hole, located near 23,2 Â ° N 73,7 Â ° W / 23.2; -73.7 ( Location of Hurricane Joaquin at 8:00 on October 1 ) at 8:00 am, where winds over 80 kn (150 km/h, 92 mph) and waves of 20 to 30 feet (6 to 9 m) are likely to hit the ship.
Voyage Recorder Audio data
On December 13, 2016, NTSB released a 500 page transcript of a conversation that took place on the bridge within the last 26 hours of the ship, as recorded by Vessel's Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) and its six microphones.
The transcript describes a rapidly deteriorating situation.
At 5:43 pm, the captain picked up a phone call signifying a flood allegation at no. 3 cargo hold and send pair head to investigate. The crew then began to take steps to try to assess and control the flood.
At 6:13 am, the ship lost its steam driving plant.
At 6:54 pm, the captain received a phone call describing the situation above:
- "It's sad now... we got all uhh - all the winds on the right side here.Now the rapids are left open or popping open or whatever so we got some floods into three hatches - a significant amount of Umm, everyone is safe now, we will not leave the ship - we will stay with the ship We are in trouble now, Okay, I will call the office and tell them. [oath] Okay Umm does not need to sound a general alarm - we do not leave the ship. The engineers are trying to get the plants back so we're working on them - okay? "
At 07:06, the captain made a phone call. He says:
- "I have a marine emergency and I want to talk to QI We had a stomach crash - falling [open hatch] during a storm We have water in three holds We have a heavy list We lost main driving units. The engineers can not bring it in. Can I talk to QI? "
- "We have uhh secured the water source that goes into the ship, uh, A is entangled open... it has since closed, but uh, the three holds have enough water in it.. Uh, we have a very, very healthy The engineers can not get the lubricating oil pressure in the factory, therefore we do not have a main engine, and let me give you latitude and longitude.I just want to give you a head before I press that button - press that button. "
- "The crew is safe now we are trying to save the ship now, but uh all hands are available We are forty eight miles east of San Salvador We take every step to remove the list I mean pumping out the pump the best we can but we do not get the ground right now. "
- "It's kind of hard to say now because all the wind... on that side too, so we got a good gust of wind, but that does not get any better."
- "[We] will stay with the ship... no one panics, everyone has been awakened... Our safest bet is to stay with the ship for a certain time, the weather is ferocious here and we will stay by ship... swell is in the northeast, ten to twelve solid feet (over) spray, high winds, visibility is very bad... "
At 7:10 am, the captain told someone on the phone that they had a list of 10 to 15 degrees, "but a lot of it with high winds." He lets the person know he will make an emergency call to USCG, and then directs the second pair to activate the GMDSS SSAS/alarm button, and directs him to wake everyone up.
At 7:15 am, my friend returns to the bridge:
- Chairman: "I think the water level goes up, Captain."
- Captain: "(okay.) Do you know where it came from?"
- Chief Mate: "(at) first Chief says something about the main fire Understand apparently.
- Captain: "Um, is there no way to secure it?"
- Chief Mate: "We do not know if they still have pressure on the main fire or not, do not know where the sea - between the sea suction and the hull or what uh but whatever I say is a guess."
At 7:17 am, the chief engineer informed the chief and the captain on a sound-powered phone that the hull's alarm would be "two alpha." The captain asks his head if he can pump all the cargo at the same time, and discuss the list that goes bad. The chief tells the captain that the cars are floating on a cargo load # 3, and that the main fire is below the water surface, so he can not see the damage or if the water is still in.
At 7:19 am, after a further discussion with the chief, the captain called the chief engineer again, asking, "Can you... isolate the main flame from below in the uh engine room?... On the side of the engine room the isolation valve [on] suction [ to] fire pump... secure, isolation on your side so no free communication from the sea. "
At 7:24, the captain, speaking with a crew member on the phone, said, "We still have the carrying capacity and the stability of the reserve."
At 7:27 am, the captain ordered the second pair to sound a general alarm and wake the crew.
At 7:29, the captain gave orders to leave the ship, and about a minute later could be heard on the bridge while shouting, "The bow is down, the bow is down."
At 07:31, the captain yelled at the UHF radio for his friend's head to "Get in your raft! Throw all your rafts into the water! Everyone's down! Get off the boat! Stay together!"
From 7:32 am, the captain sounded trying to help a panicked helicopter, a capable seaman, got off the bridge, with the alarm ringing. The captain repeatedly told the helmsman not to panic: "work your way here," "you're fine, come on," and "I will not leave you, let's go!" The skipper exclaimed, "I need a ladder! A line!" and, "I need someone to help me!"
At 07:39, the VDR recording ended with the captain and AB still on the bridge.
Search operation
On October 1, the WC-130J Super Hercules Storm Hunter aircraft from the US Air Force Reserve 53rd Weather Reconnaissance Squadron attempted to find El Faro with no results. On October 2, a Hercules Coast Guard HC-130H aircraft from CGAS. Clearwater, Florida started a special quest for the ship. USCGC Northland and MH-60T Jayhawk helicopter from CGAS. Clearwater, Florida joined the search effort later in the day. United States Coast Guard MH-65C Dolphin Helicopters from CGAS. Miami, Florida, and CGAS. Borinquen, Puerto Rico together with HC-144A Marine Sea patrol plane from Miami are also present. The airplane flew on 3 October in harsh storm conditions, marked with winds over 100 kn (185 km/h, 115 mph) at 1,000 feet (300 m), waves up to 40 feet (12 m), and visibility less than 1Ã, nmi (1.9Ã, km; 1.2Ã, mi). Despite the dangerous conditions, the helicopter crew recovered the life rings from the ship today. Conditions rose sharply on October 4 when Joaquin moved northeast away from the Bahamas; the average wind is 15 kn (28 km/h, 17 mph) and visibility is unlimited. Taking advantage of the sunny weather, the helicopter stays in flight for 11 hours, requiring twice refueling. The second HC-130, USCGC Charles Sexton , and USCGC Resolute were deployed on that day. Northland and Resolute resumed operations last night with engineers using night vision goggles to take part in the search. The United States Navy provides P-8A Poseidon fixed wing aircraft from NAS. Jacksonville, Florida to help on 5th October; three Crowley Maritime tugs also joined. Search operations are done at a very fast pace on this date.
On October 5, an unidentified body in survival apparel, presumably from El Faro , was found but not found. According to rescue divers, the body is unrecognizable, its head is three times the normal size, and left to be taken during the day. However, failure in SLDMB device positioning eventually resulted in a loss of body. Some other unopened clothes were found. Damaged life rafts and a heavily damaged lifeboat - one of two El Faro vessels, each capable of carrying 43 people and filled with food and water for several days - with no single ship found. The ship was declared missing at sea today, believed to have sunk at 15,000 feet (4,600 m) of water, and the search turned into search and recovery efforts. The United States Air Force and Air National Guard provided three additional HC-130P/J aircraft on 6 October. A total of 183,000 sqÃ, nmi (630,000 km 2 ; 242,000 sqÃ, mi) of water is a closed looking vessel. Two areas of debris are found: one covering 260Ã, sqÃ, nmi (890Ã, km 2 ) is located near the final El Faro ' and others include 61Ã, sqÃ, nmi (210Ã, km 2 ) located 60Ã, nmi (110 km km) northeast of the first debris field. At sunset on October 7, the Coast Guard announced the suspension of search operations.
Aftermath
On October 7, the Navy rescue team was asked, on the orders of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), to search for the wreckage of the aircraft. Florida Senator Bill Nelson wrote a letter to the NTSB urging them to look at TOTE's policy on bad weather. Nelson also mentioned that the ship's lifeboats were "outdated and insufficient for the conditions facing the crew." TOTE set up funding for the crew's family on October 9 through the Seamen Church Institute in New York and New Jersey. On October 14, a $ 100 million lawsuit was filed against the TOTE by a family member of one of the missing crew, citing negligence on behalf of the company in allowing unsuitable vessels to sail to a storm. On October 28, another suit was filed on behalf of the plantation of a man who died in the sinking of a ship. The complaint states that "without power, M/V EL FARO is just a cork in the ocean when the Storm approaches." On April 19, 2016, TOTE Maritime has completed with 18 out of 33 families with more than $ 7 million.
MV Isla Bella is selected to replace El Faro ' previous operations.
Search for junk
On October 19th, USNS Apache departs from the Little Creek-Fort Story Joint Expeditionary Base in Virginia Beach, Virginia to perform underwater searches for El Faro . The ship is equipped with a towed pinger locator, side-scan sonar, and a vehicle operated remotely. The search crew identified the vessel as of October 31 at an approximate depth of 15,000 feet (4,600 m). The hydrostatic pressure at this depth is about 6,688 pounds per square inch (46,110 kPa). The NTSB reported that the object was, "consistent with cargo ships [790Ã, ft (240 m)... in an upright and intact position." On November 16, the National Transportation Safety Board announced it had completed its search for a sinking ship but did not find a data shipping recorder. On January 3, 2016, NTSB opened a general crash map on the sinking investigation of El Faro , initially releasing underwater images and vessel videos.
Second and third search attempts for VDR
On April 18, 2016, the NTSB, utilizing RV Atlantis , a navy ship operated by pioneers of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, launched a second search for ship vessel data recorders (VDR). On April 26, the NTSB stated that the travel data recorder was found about 41 mi (66 km) northeast of the Acklins and Crooked Islands, Bahamas. NTSB could not take recorder at that time because of its proximity to the pole and other obstacles. On August 5, 2016, USNS Apache returned to the site. On August 9, 2016, the shipping data recorder was finally recovered from the wreckage by USNS Apache, 10 months after it sank. The VDR was then sent to NTSB in Mayport, FL to continue the investigation.
Presentation of findings
US Coast Guard
The Coast Guard El Faro The Marine Board of Investigation completed its final report on September 24, 2017 and published it on October 1, 2017 at its document library. The Report of the Board of the Ocean pages a 199-page breakdown of facts, analyzes, and conclusions and makes safety, administrative, and enforcement recommendations.
Coast Guard investigators put virtually all the blame on Michael Davidson, Captain's Captain
Coast Guard investigators also berate TOTE Maritime, the owner of the owner, stating that the company committed several offenses related to break times and crew members' working hours, lacking a safety officer dedicated to watching El Faro , and using an outdated, "open" lifeboat (similar to the type used on older vessels, such as RMS Titanic ) rather than modern day crafts closed survival, among other violations.
NTSB
NTSB meets in Washington, D.C. on December 12, 2017, to discuss the factors contributing to its sinking and "vote on recommendations to address security issues discovered during the investigation." The board meeting was live. The board's 400-page report:
- criticized the captain's decision to advance to the impending storm, despite numerous calls from the crew to change course, and noted he relied on outdated weather information from commercial services
- criticize Coast Guard practices in shipbuilding, freeing them from using a closed lifeboat: worn lifeboats are not well maintained, they are not launched, and most likely they will not offer any useful protection
- noting the owner's failure to keep the ship superannuated and deteriorating
See also
- List of Bermuda Triangle incidents
- List of disasters in the United States by the death toll
- List of maritime disasters in the 21st century
- List of roll-on/roll-off ship accidents
- List of shipwrecks by 2015
- List of North American shipwrecks
References
External links and further reading
Source of the article : Wikipedia
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